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Abstract 
 
Building huge infrastructure projects is challenging for governments. Trying to include the 
national firms to increase their competencies may be even more difficult in the context of 
developing countries where the infrastructure is needed “yesterday”. By utilizing the new 
economic institutions theory, new institutional sociology and agency theory, I am exploring the 
challenging situation of the contracting system in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The 
research object is a Tasi-Mane cluster project, where 16 interviews with involved actors have 
been conducted in early 2015. The findings present a strong lack of national participation in the 
infrastructure projects.  
Thus, the research shows that there are various public and private actors involved in the 
contractual regime, while institutional arrangements and coordination between actors are weak. 
The emerging organizational field lacks the power and is disconnected from the rest of the 
economic development. Also interactions do not increase in the adequate speed, nor the 
information load, which keeps the field in immature state. National firms are both included and 
excluded from the participation in the infrastructure projects by legal forces (law), international 
companies and other factors. To some extent the previous experiences with national firms have 
raised the doubts of their capabilities, experiences as well as morale and thus decrease the 
probability of their involvement in the infrastructure projects. If not addressed, the problem can 
become chronic and Timor-Leste will be relying on the international companies in terms of 
building the infrastructure as well as maintaining it afterwards. This study points how to develop 
the contracting regime further in accordance with the strategy development plan (SDP) 2011-
2030, and include the national firms in building the economy of Timor-Leste. Several changes 
need to be implemented in order to increase the performance and participation of the national 
firms and make them full members of the field.  
 
Suggestions for future studies and limitations are highlighted. 
 
Keywords: Actors, organizational field, governance structures, institutional theory, contractual 
regime, petroleum infrastructures project, Tasi-Mane, Timor-Leste 
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Resumo 
A construção de projetos de grandes infraestruturas é um desafio para os governos. A tentativa 
de envolver as empresas nacionais no aumento das suas competências pode ser ainda mais difícil 
no contexto dos países em desenvolvimento, onde as infraestruturas são necessárias "para 
ontem". Procurei analisar a situação desafiadora do sistema de contratação na República 
Democrática de Timor-Leste tendo em consideração a nova teoria de instituições económicas, a 
nova sociologia institucional e a teoria da agência. O objeto de pesquisa é um projecto conjunto 
em Tasi-Mane e, no início de 2015 foram realizadas 16 entrevistas a intervenientes envolvidos 
no projeto. Os resultados apresentam uma elevada falta de participação nacional nos projetos de 
infraestruturas. 
Assim, a pesquisa indica que existem diversos intervenientes, públicos e privados, envolvidos no 
regime contratual, no entanto, a organização e coordenação entre estes intervenientes é 
insuficiente. As organizações emergentes não têm poder e estão desajustadas relativamente ao 
restante desenvolvimento económico. As interações não aumentam de acordo com o necessário e 
o mesmo acontece com a quantidade de informação, o que mantém as organizações num estado 
de imaturidade. As empresas nacionais são incluídas e excluídas da participação nos projetos de 
infraestruturas pelas forças legais (legislação), pelas empresas internacionais e outros fatores. Em 
certa medida, as experiências anteriores com empresas nacionais têm levantado dúvidas 
relativamente às suas capacidades, experiência, assim como questões de ordem moral, 
diminuindo a probabilidade do seu envolvimento nos projetos de infraestruturas. Se este 
problema não for abordado pode tornar-se crónico e Timor-Leste ficará dependente de empresas 
internacionais em termos de construção de infraestruturas, bem como a respetiva manutenção. 
Este estudo indica como se deve desenvolver o regime de contratação de acordo com o plano de 
desenvolvimento estratégico (SDP) 2011-2030, por forma a incluir as empresas nacionais na 
construção da economia de Timor-Leste. Precisam de ser implementadas várias modificações de 
modo a aumentar o desempenho e a participação das empresas nacionais e torná-las membros de 
pleno direito da área. 
São ainda destacadas sugestões para estudos futuros e algumas limitações. 
 
Palavras-chave: Atores, campo organizacional, estruturas de governação, teoria institucional, 
regime contratual, projeto de infra-estruturas de petróleo, Tasi-Mane, Timor-Leste. 
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Sammendrag på norsk 
 
Det å bygge store infrastrukturprosjekter er utfordrende for myndigheter. Det å samtidig 
inkludere nasjonale bedrifter for å øke deres prosjektgjennomføringskompetanse kan være enda 
vanskeligere for utviklingsland der infrastrukturen helst burde vært bygd "i går". Ved å benytte 
ny økonomisk institusjonell teori, ny institusjonell sosiologisk teori og agentteori, utforsker jeg 
den utfordrende situasjonen for Den demokratiske republikken Timor-Leste ved innkjøp og 
bygging av større infrastrukturprosjekter. Forskningsobjektet er Tasi-Mane cluster-prosjektet, 
hvor jeg har utført 16 intervjuer med involverte aktører i begynnelsen av 2015. Funnene i 
undersøkelsen indikerer en sterk mangel av nasjonal deltakelse i infrastruktur prosjektene Tasi-
Mane cluster-prosjektet representerer. 
Denne forskning viser videre at det er ulike offentlige og private aktører involvert i utformingen 
av kontraktsregimet, samtidig som institusjonelle ordninger og koordinering mellom aktørene er 
svake. Nasjonale bedrifter er både inkludert og ekskludert fra deltakelse i infrastrukturprosjekter 
av lovverket i Timor-Leste, nasjonale rammebetingelser og internasjonale selskaper. Til en viss 
grad har myndighetenes tidligere erfaringer med nasjonale bedrifter reist tvil om nasjonale 
bedrifters evner, erfaringer, samt moral og dermed redusere sannsynligheten for deres 
engasjement i infrastrukturprosjekter. Hvis dette emnet ikke adresseres, kan problemet bli 
kroniske og Timor-Leste vil være avhengig av de internasjonale selskapene i forhold til å bygge 
infrastruktur samt vedlikeholde disse etterpå. Denne studien peker hvordan en kan utvikle 
kontraktsregimet ytterligere i tråd med strategien i utbyggingsplan (SDP) 2011-2030. Forslagene 
anviser hvordan de nasjonale selskapene kan inkluderes i å bygge økonomien i Timor-Leste. 
Flere endringer må iverksettes for å øke ytelsen og deltakelse fra de nasjonale bedrifter og gjøre 
dem i stand til å konkurrere på like fot nasjonalt og internasjonalt. 
 
Forslag til fremtidige studier og begrensninger er også diskutert. 
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction  
1.1 Background description  
Today almost all countries have been involved in building of big infrastructure projects. High 
cost results that usually these projects are initiated and financed by government capital or state 
sources (Chan et al., 2009; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, Sanchez-Robles, 1998). It is proven that 
building infrastructure increases business activities and productivity (Égert, Kozluk & 
Sutherland, 2009). Thus, infrastructure contributes to boosting of economic growth by giving 
access to main and key services (ADB, JBIC, World Bank, 2005). In addition, the development 
of infrastructure can be a driver for poverty reduction (Calderón & Servén, 2004; Cockburn et 
al., 2013).  
Government itself has no opportunity to build the projects; therefore, it attracts the sub-
contractors. In order to attract the suitable candidates as well as make the process competitive 
and transparent, achieve efficient and prompt delivery of the project, governments have been 
utilizing the tender system of bidding and subsequent contracting (Klein, 2008; Furubotn and 
Richter, 2010). It is also a choice for opening for international bidding in order to access the 
specific competences. Final choice depends on many factors and criteria can be different from 
project to project according to the aim that needs to be achieved. This means in some cases, if the 
infrastructure is needed as quick as possible, it can be afforded but on a high expense, while 
making it slower might give an opportunity of making it cheaper and building the local 
competences (e.g., Fill & Visser, 2000; Tadelis, 2002). Thus, planning a big infrastructure 
project will involve making choices and negotiating.   
In developed countries, national firms can have competitive advantage over their international 
competitors in terms of better understanding of the local context, may possess a specifically 
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developed technology, and potentially increase local employment and taxes, simply keeping the 
money “in house”. In developing countries the situation may not be the same, and opening of a 
tender for participation from international organizations with more experience, equipment and 
capacity, can significantly impair the chances of the national organizations in the bidding rounds.   
This issue is especially important for young developing countries such as República Democrática 
de Timor-Leste (hereafter: RDTL). RDTL needs a rapid development in order to be included into 
the global economy. However, weak institutions and lack of infrastructure hinders this process 
(see, e.g., see Easterly and Levine, 1997; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Remote regions are not 
able to fully participate in the economy and thus remain in their traditional path of development. 
The lack of connection in traditional regions leads to spread of different dialects, methods of 
traditional agriculture, domestic violence, lack of education and lack of understanding of the 
current changes. Being separated, these regions do not follow the rules and regulations made 
from the capital and thus make a huge difficulty for governments to be addressed to and 
informed. These people do not travel much and therefore are not engaged into the economy 
building through employment, taxation system and other attributes of the developed firms. Other 
issue is a lack of funding and general banking system is not as developed and supportive to the 
national commercial organizations/ entrepreneurs, leading to that only government have funds to 
engage in big infrastructure projects. Thirdly, the level of technology remains poor, when it 
comes to the ability to serve and build a big infrastructure project (e.g., Kusago, 2005).  
When it comes to start-up of an infrastructure project, the problems, faced by government of a 
developing country, are many. Among them:  (1) lack of national firms with enough equipment, 
experience, capacity, and capital (2) lack of legitimacy and trust from other countries and thus 
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poor participation in tender (3) poor legislation/lack of national legislation (4) tender 
manipulations or corruption (Soreide, 2006; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998). 
At the same time government faces other challenges as to what extend involve the national and 
international firms, how to find a balance between the experience, speed and efficiency and 
learning of national firms for the potential for further maintenance by local and national firms. 
The right decision may be crucial for the whole country development and therefore this study is 
of high importance as it considers these issues. 
A motivation or aim of this study has been to explore challenges and opportunities for increased 
national industry participation in International Tasi-Mane downstream projects. The research 
problem addressed in this study is: “What institutional forces have been forming the current 
contractual regime in RDTL?” To address this broad problem, I have been dividing it into sub-
questions to get a more concrete understanding of the following issues:    
a) What institutional actors have participated in the formation of the current contractual 
regime and how? 
b) How was the local industry/national firms included and excluded in this formation of 
current contractual regime?  
c) What forces has been stimulating /hindering for formation of the contractual regime? 
d) How does government balance short term quality versus long term capacity building? 
 
The above stated questions are thoroughly chosen and aim to contribute both to the theoretical 
development of the contractual regime and address some problems that developing countries 
experience during this process and provide possible ways of searching for solutions.  
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Firstly, to understand the challenges perceived by the government of RDTL, I will describe the 
interaction between the players and how the government apparat around contractual regime has 
been developing from 2002, the year the RDTL became an independent country. The focus of 
this study is on the most recent big infrastructure project within petroleum sector – Tasi-Mane.   
 
My approach is to explain in detail how the Tasi-Mane cluster projects’ tender and contracting 
mechanism are executed and whether the national petroleum company, named Timor Gap  
invites the national firms into participating in the bidding for the Tasi-Mane projects, whether 
national companies actually participate in bidding and/or further sub-contracting after project 
initiation.  The answers for these key questions will then give an understanding of how the 
mechanism of Timorese government owned company TIMOR GAP is implemented and has 
influenced the participation of national companies. This thesis compares the feedback from the 
national companies that have participated and those who have not participated and the various 
government structures and responsible ministries in order to answer the research questions. In 
addition, with these questions I can understand how current contracting mechanism helps to 
achieve the transparency and legitimacy for the RDTL for the national and international 
companies and authorities.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is as follows: firstly, the theoretical background for this research is 
discussed. Secondly, the methodology of the research is presented and a description of data 
collection process included. Next, the local context of the research is outlined. Finally, I present 
my analysis of empirical data and findings and conclude with a discussion of key findings and 
suggestions for further research/implications.  
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Chapter 2.0 Theoretical framework  
In this theoretical framework I present three theoretical approaches that can guide the research 
and give insights in how Timorese government contracting system decisions are made and what 
actions can engage and enable the participation of national companies in the Timor Gap projects.  
Competitive contracting has become an attractive form in developing countries due to changing 
conditions of international aid and desire to get a quick way to respond to current gaps in 
essential public services (Smith et al., 2005). Annually, a lot of million dollars are contracted by 
governments. Infrastructure projects are not an exception. Governments are constantly pressed to 
be more effective, cut the costs and at the same time provide more services, be more flexible and 
responsible (Smith et al., 2005). The historical formation of the contractual regime, the role of 
the involved actors, potential problems in form of moral hazard and information asymmetry are 
further addressed in this section through the lenses of New Institutional Economics, New 
Institutional Sociology and Agency Theory.  
New Institutional Economic theory or Williamson’s approach gives a solid framework to analyze 
the historical formation of the government structure, organization of institutional arrangements 
and   focuses on four levels of the involvement of the national organization in the contracting 
system. It consists of four interconnected levels of social analysis. Secondly, New Institutional 
Sociology theory addresses the capabilities of state’s strategy and its effect on industry projects 
implementation and helps to analyze historical processes of contractual and organizational 
changes. Institutional approach gives a better understanding of the processes that lead to the 
development of mechanisms, which influence the amount of national firm’s participation. Lastly, 
Agency theory provides the explanation of the possible situations of moral hazard and 
information asymmetry in contractual arrangements.  
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2.1 New institutional economics (NIE) perspective 
New institutional economics perspective has become a new branch of knowledge as an 
interdisciplinary research merging several fields of studies such as sociology, organization 
theory, economics and political science (Klein, 1999). It offers a comprehensive view on the 
formation, development and day to day operation of institutions within the contracting regime, 
and their influence on other actors. 
Williamson (1985, 1998 & 2000) defines four social levels of analysis in NIE: embeddedness, 
institutional environment, governance, resource allocation and employment (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Williamson Economics of institutions (from Williamson, 1998, p.26).  
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As we can see each of the levels has a different frequency. It means that some processes can be 
observed in short time, while others only within centuries or even millenniums.  
The highest level, embeddedness, refers to religion and taboos, customs and norms, which are 
being practiced for a long term, forming a context or the environment where the actors operate. 
This level is important, as it consists of informal institutions that change very slowly. 
Understanding these forces may predict the certain behavior of the actors in a given environment 
and industry, ceteris paribus (Williamson, 1998). Informal constraints are located at this level. 
The second level, institutional environment, provides the structure of the institutions and the 
rules of the game, by which the economic activity is organized. This implies that formal 
constraints are located at this level. All written laws and regulations are representing this level. 
Williamson stresses that design instruments, executive, judicial, legislative and bureaucratic 
functions of government are constrained by the shadows of the past – past decisions bear 
consequences to the present situation.  Institutional environment establishes the rules of the game 
such as legislation, political forces and bureaucracy. Furthermore, NIE emphasizes how 
economies run at the country level and concerns how economic, political, legal and social 
institutions influence their performance (Platteau, 1994a, b). On this level, the economic 
development of the nation can be evaluated (North and Weingast, 1989; North 1981). Definition 
of property rights and contract laws are established in this level (Williamson, 2000). While it 
may seem that contract law would have made a perfect and costless way of functioning of legal 
system, in the real life the problems and disagreements occur and need to be solved by the means 
of court. This leads us to the next level, which introduces the development of the contractual 
relations and their governance. 
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The third level is governance. Governance refers to “the play of the game” such as contract 
aligning governance structure with transactions.   
 
2.1.1. Institutional arrangement 
Institutional arrangements is the ways in which transaction are organized, are particular guiding 
principle as what Williamson (1985, 1996) names “governance structures” that are drawn by the 
trading associate/partner to act as intermediary in specific economic relations, or in other words 
as an accord/contract agreed by particular individuals to administer their own relations. 
Institutional arrangements are the traditions and rules that fabricate the institutional environment 
are mainly be on economic sides occurrence/phenomenon. This governance include public 
bureaucracies, business firms, nonprofit organizations, long-term contracts, commercial contracts 
and other contractual arrangements are considered as form of institutional arrangements 
(Williamson, 1996).  
Contractual arrangements 
As presented earlier, there is macro level of NIE that calls institutional environment which is 
elaborated by Davis and North (1971, 6) and a micro level call institutional arrangement. And 
Williamson (1979) transaction cost economic is deal with institutional arrangement. Transaction 
cost economic recommends that by paying attention on transaction cost, and pursuit all those 
governance structures or arrangement that make economies on costs, according to (Masten, 
1996) a person who make policy or decision able to tailored and decide an appropriate design of 
organizational. Even though, this manner may incline to simplify the matters of institutional 
options or choices. A helpful concept into contracting process offers by transaction cost 
economics. 
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According to the idea of transaction cost economics from Williamson approach it suggested that 
there is no black and white distinction to be produced between “hierarchies” and “markets”. It 
was clear that the fact is that in new institutional economics realm, the application of Pareto 
Optimal abstraction is not there.  There is a prominence emphasis that in this enlightenment 
method various substantial amount from a comparative institutional method in which the relevant 
alternative is between diverse option concrete institutional arrangement (Demsetz, 1969). 
With this understanding, Furubotn & Richter’s (2010) study on the new institutional economics 
of markets have designed an governance structure approaches of dealing with some sort of 
primary activities of trade such as: search, inspection, bargaining, contract execution, control, 
and enforcement. In addition, the approach in which these primary purposes are achieved has 
considerable evidence based magnitude in the friction-filled new institutional economics realm.  
Every government has their own interest to make their choice. Furubotn & Richter (2010, p. 4) 
contractual arrangement of transaction activities is organized in three different levels; ‘(1) pre-
contractual activities – (pre-qualifications or search and inspection) (2) contracting - 
(negotiations, contract formation), (3) post-contractual (execution, control, enforcement)’. 
Transaction cost 
Coase (1937) define transaction cost as a theory that developed to provide explanation to a firms’ 
decision to “make” (vertically integrate) rather than depending or relying on relationship of 
market based (buy) to gain inputs of intermediary manufacturing. Or in the other words, in this 
case, a government will tend to expand until the cost of organizing an extra transaction within 
the government will become equal to the cost of carrying out the same transactions by means of 
exchange on the open market.  Furthermore, Williamson (1989) with other scholars has produced 
this TCT framework into a costs major source that a firm must attempt to reduce so that 
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increases efficiency of economic.  With this framework, behavior opportunistic threat from a 
partner of transacting is should be a massive influence on a decision of firm to not or to 
internalize transaction. 
A transaction cost is simply as the friction between buyer and seller which is explained by 
opportunistic behavior. Williamson (1985) defines opportunistic behavior as a self-interest 
seeking with guile. It includes methods of misleading, distortion, disguise and confusion. 
Williamson (1989) distinguishes between ex ante and ex post transaction cost. Ex ante costs are 
those of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. Among ex post costs, Williamson 
mention bad adjustment costs, haggling cost, setup and running costs associated with the 
governance structures to which disputes are referred, and bonding costs of effecting secure 
commitments. Transaction cost analysis (TCA) provides insight that cost minimization explains 
structural decision. The friction between buyer and seller is higher than through and interval 
hierarchical system the buyer should internalize. To internalize, that is, integrate vertically, to 
reduce transaction cost. The essence of transactions cost theory assumption is that government 
will try to minimize the combination of costs under ex ante and ex post cost when undertaking 
transaction costs. Therefore, when considering the most efficient form of organizing its services 
and projects, the buyer will choose the solution that minimizes the sum of ex ante and ex post 
costs.  
 
2.1.2. Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective employed here as theoretical framework to 
explain how the government contract is formulated. Transaction cost economics constitutes an 
additional method to understand institutional arrangements. Thus, in this situation, the attention 
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is on governing or administering transactions. This is what Williamson (1985) promotes a 
governance structure. The administering governance needed to keep from harm/safeguard the 
trading parties from a variety of hazards related with exchange.  TCE carries that all yet the 
modest transaction needs some sort of mechanisms. Williamson (1985) the suitable governance 
structure rely on transactions’ features and unique.  
The governance method or technique is defined by its prominence incomplete contract. Thus, in 
the frame of transaction cost, normally costs are imposed by economic organization because in 
usual practice the most complex contracts are incomplete. Therefore Williamson (1981, 1985) 
his analytical about transaction cost economics in particular investment might play a very 
important role after a contract is concluded. Because among others non-standards contract or an 
imperfect contract may occur as result from practices of monopolistic. Transaction cost is 
important as Williamson describes it by utilizing “fundamental transformation” concept (change 
from thick markets at contract selection stage to bilateral dependency at contract execution and 
renewal stages). Right after conclusion of a contract, a locked situation of a bilateral monopoly 
likely happens where the parties meet themselves. Even though previously they were free to 
indicate with whom to work with. Whatever transaction type of investment, bargaining, 
inspection and search are main points of making transformation happen. Moreover, it has to take 
into account that future is uncertain we never know what future will bring. Williamson’s 
transaction is known as contract theory that usually functions in the uncertainty situation 
information of asymmetric in which self-enforcement and legal enforcement hand in hand. 
Holdup problem 
The contracting interested parties exposed to some sort of risks when contract is incomplete. 
Mainly when situations alter all of a sudden/unexpectedly, the earliest governing/administering 
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consensus may no more be useful.  The necessity to adjust to unpredicted possibility adds up to 
and additional contracting cost. Collapse or fail to adapt forces what Williamson (1991a) names 
“maladaptation costs”. The most frequent and debated exemplar of maladaptation is “holdup” 
problem or delay/robbery problem. This holdup problem is related to particular relationship of 
investments. Investing in specific assets brings agents to possible hazard. So the well know of a 
contractual hazard’s example is holdup problem. In most cases, Williamson (1996b, p. 14) 
contractual hardships can appear from various origins ‘(a) bilateral dependence; (b) weak 
property rights; (c) measurement difficulties and/or over searching; (d) intertemporal issues that 
can take the form of disequilibrium contracting, real time responsive, long latency and strategic 
abuse; and weaknesses in the institutional environment.’ They have possibility to force 
maladaptation costs.  
 
2.1.3. Economic history and economic growth 
The consideration of economic growth and economic history to the institutional environment 
have got progressively common or frequent in economic history and has greater impact enhance 
our conception of how economic grow through time (North et al., 1973; North, 1990). 
Development of economic is visible as an answer to the institutions development or 
transformation that contributes to the relationships of commercial and social. Therefore, 
economic growth is no more be highly regarded as a steady or slow, unavoidable evolution from 
local self-sufficiency to specialization and labor divisions. Development of economic 
accordingly rely on the level to which trade possible hazards (opportunism, the like, and 
shirking) can be ruled by institutions, which lowering costs of information, ensure the 
establishment of capital and offer cooperation. In addition, Wallis and North (1986) booming in 
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commercial activity imply ‘transacting’ as a result of an economics industrializing; finance, 
management, trade, banking and insurance. The growing of market and industrialization needs 
the presence of institutions to lessen the costs related with transactions. North (1991) the main 
roles of economic history and of economic development is to describe for the transformation of 
economic and political institutions that provoke and provide an economic environment that 
encourage enlargement or escalate productivity. 
 
2.2 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) perspective  
According to Dobbin (1997) and Lounsbury (2008) institutional theory form an idea or describe 
institutions as identity, capable of producing of interests, and examples of convenient practice 
that take form in broad context of socio-cultural. Severally, this comprehensive context equip the 
institutional pillar regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive forces/pressures essentially form 
the behavior of organizational (Lounsbury, 2000; Scott 2008b). Institutions are vary and formed 
in different level where it can be interpreted in many stages it depends the researcher either use 
top-down or bottom-up institutional approach or high level pillars or field level phenomena. 
Therefore more relevant here as empirical principle and most significance master concepts for 
institutional theory, is that of organizational fields (Owen-smith and Powell, 2008; Scott 2008b).  
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Scott et al., (2000) viewed organizational field as organizations 
community that take part in similar activities and are fundamental to common pressures or forces 
of regulatory and reputational. Little more vibrant definition prompt distinguished fields play to 
attract positions to bring opportunity and make narrow the possibilities of different group of 
social. In addition fields are formed through into its characteristic shaped by expectations and 
conventions, and rules that establish convenient activities and legitimate or valid positions 
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(Owen-smith and Powell, 2008). Hence, this definition stressed “fields of force” that set social 
action. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) view on organizational field, constitutes those 
organizations, in entirety representing acknowledged domain of institutional life: key national 
firms, regulatory agencies, consumers, and other organizations producing similar products or 
services. By finding what types of institution are in the process of being developed within the 
fields and understand how it went and try to find forces or drivers of such development. 
Investigating this kind of questions is a crucial or a great significance precondition to grasp or 
apprehend changes occur in organizations.  
Table 1 theoretical perspective on organizational fields 
 
Source: From Machado et al., (2010 p. 34). 
As we can see each of the theoretical perspectives has almost in the same emphasis on field. It 
means that these perspectives can be observed in the current case. But, I paid much attention on 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) institutional theoretical framework of “emergence of fields” or 
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what they call totality of relevant actors “connectedness and structural equivalence”. 
DiMaggio (1982) institutional process definition, “structuration” which consist of the 
explanation of (1) an increase interaction among organizations in the field (2) emergence of 
inter-organizational power (3) increase in information load for the organizations in the field (4) 
development of mutual awareness of the organizations in a set of organizations that they are 
participate in a usual or common enterprise. Laumann et al, (1987) defined connectedness as 
transactions existence that binding tightly organizations in the field one another; for instance, 
Williamson (1979) contractual relational may include, personnel participation in common 
enterprises for example; labor union, professional associations, or in level of informal 
organizations ties such as flows of personnel. This is the constellations of organizations that are 
powerfully linked to one another. While structural equivalence is commonality of position in a 
relationship structure (White et al., 1976); for instance; structurally equivalent of two 
organizations if they are tightly of the similar constellations of other organizations, even if they 
themselves are not related.  
According to Morrill (2007) emerging fields illustrated as evolving via tree phases; innovation 
stage where actors exploiting some and ignoring others to advance their own interests; in the 
mobilization phase wherein clear institutional credential is disappearing/nonattendance, progress 
of fields is of oftentimes full of complexity power dynamics as several actors competing to 
achieve disciples/follower for their logic. Structuration phase refers solid application, where 
(Reay, Golden-Biddle, & GermAnn, 2006) interpreted logics as “concrete practices” and 
interchangeable, taken-for-granted norms and structures (DiMaggio, 1991; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988) field levels and emerge at the organizational. 
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So, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Morrill (2007) commonly presented that, organizations in 
the field can generally prepare/cultivate opportunities for change, assemble help from 
institutionalized actors, searching to fit into prevailing systems, and seeking several new ideas 
begin to diffuse, actors may draw selectively from them, where actors used to diffuse their 
preferred logics and multiple logics within the focal field, exploiting some and ignoring others to 
advance their own interests, improve their objective to develop new action, and making rational 
decisions to move forward. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) Identify three defining process from the contemporary institutional 
theories of organizations by establishing of earlier conceptions and relative permanence which is 
treating institutionalization as a variable and separating its causes from the major consequences.  
(a) Mimetic or imitative, others’ achievements or successful components adopted when 
alternatives are uncertain, (b) normative connections about facts of social, generally from outside 
sources, for example professions, (c) another definition process is “coercive” is a heart to state 
legitimation in the environment as approach of institution. It is pressures from other 
organizations in which they are dependent upon and by cultural expectations from society.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) at the very beginning differentiated two origins of isomorphism of 
organizational which is institutional and competitive. Latter in its changing was a driver for the 
aim of legitimacy and started involved mimetic, coercive and normative forces, where this can 
now related and embedded with normative, regulative and cultural-cognitive as high level 
institutional pillars (Scott 2008b). Previously, this was described of obtaining economic and 
technical efficiency. Considerable amount of users and researchers read this classification as 
illustrations of distinct type of organizations (Powell 1991). The extensive analysis from Powell 
has been used in many areas of discipline. This can be described that organizations economic and 
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technical objectives are established by the people in the context of social life, and it now can be 
associated in the institution constructed by (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 
2008). In this sense, competitive forces and institutional may affect and relate to each other, and 
have combinations effect on the process of organizational changes. Thus, the combination of 
them was proposed. 
Grasping the various of organizational practice, as Lounsbury (2008) proposed, can be permitted 
by means give a central attention on rivaling logics as institutional rationalities of the actors 
constituted of organizational field’s development (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Smith and Powell 
point to Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton’s (2004) comprehensive term that an 
institutional logic is an aggregate of beliefs related practices “schemes and scripts” that a fields’ 
player mutually carry in common. Practices and beliefs have been suggested as a parcel or 
organizing principles and means for action. Logics provides rational for action. But in some 
situation when different logics comes together play in the same circumstances of platform, they 
can yield new activities and/or cause conflict. Logics more effective when they are compatible 
and when they are simply taken-for-granted. Moreover, Lounsbury underline that to perform the 
power of logic, it is requires to proof how a fast amount of wide values, cultural beliefs, 
assumptions, and rules cognition of structure and equip particular field decision making. Give 
attention on one hand to institutional dynamics, on the other hand, this view responsible to 
provide attention process and organizational practices is crucial to investigate how small-actors 
interpret the institutions.  
To summing up this theoretical perspective, as this study’ ambitions is to present what 
institutional forces have been forming the current contractual regime in RDTL. It is quite broad, 
however the combination of institutional macro and micro level are used to explain  political 
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development/changes in terms of contractual regime and be connected to organizational change, 
moreover specifically the study paid much attention where focusing to the organizations field of 
the national firms participation in Tasi-Mane project. I am going to pay attention on the 
interaction/interplay of the institutional actors pressuring the field of possible national 
firms/industry in international project of Tasi-Mane.  
 
2.3. Agency theory perspective 
Lastly, I would like to present shortly agency theory and its particular importance for this thesis 
and how it adds to our understanding in combination with the theories presented before. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989 and 1988) agency theory is taking into consideration two 
important points that transaction cost oversees. These are risk aversion and information as a 
commodity (Eisenhardt, 1989), which will be paid attention later in this subsection. 
A contract agreement and negotiations between principal and agent are central in the agency 
theory. Central is that each of them is acting in their own interest and thus some problems can 
occur. Eisenhardt (1989) divides them into two groups: a) the principal and agent have different 
and contradicting desires and goals and b) principal can experience problems in monitoring what 
agent is actually doing. The last problem is also called risk sharing and is actual when principal 
and agent differ in their attitudes towards risk. 
As for the agency problem, there can be different reasons and conflicting goals between RDTL 
government and the winning contractor. Firstly, due to the different ministries and government 
structures are involved in the different stages of contractual arrangements (pre-contractual, 
contractual, post-contractual) and each of them may have their own vision on how the contract 
should be delivered thus it makes the winning contractor to adapt and negotiate with each of 
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them. While the contractor may be interested in delivering the project faster, the government 
may start making obligations like sub-contracting to the national firms, using the local natural 
resources in building projects and so on. This can be costly for the contractor and time 
consuming as well. Also being a developing country, the monitoring system as well as legislation 
may be not sufficient and therefore the execution of the contract may be not fully and rationally 
followed and the risk of moral hazard is therefore higher here. By moral hazard is meant the lack 
of interest of the agent to be doing what the principle wants (Eisenhardt, 1989).     
Other problem that the government in a developing country may face is misunderstanding of the 
execution process due to the lack of technological equipment and education of the national 
organizations that lead the principal to agree on the terms of agent and trust that the work is 
delivered as stated in the contract. It means in practice that the governments in developing 
countries do not possess the necessary expertise to monitor the execution of the contract. This 
problem can be solved by introducing a third independent party that can evaluate the achieved 
milestones and serve as a translator between a contractor and the government authorities. When 
it comes to the information treatment, agency theory is considering it as a commodity. 
Investments in the information systems can help in order to control the agent opportunism.   
Eisenhardt, with the reference to the positivist stream of agency theory proposes that the agency 
problem can be minimized by making a contract outcome-based, when the result of it should be a 
concrete outcome that can be measured. This seems to be true in the term of infrastructure 
projects where the result can be a highway, supply base, airport building and so on. The above 
discussed theories are summarized in the table below: 
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2.4 Summary of theoretical perspectives 
Table 2 Summary of theoretical perspectives 
Theories 
perspective 
Authors Key features Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New 
Institutional 
Economic 
(NIE) 
Williamson; 
North;  
Institutional 
environment 
 
a constellation  of fundamental political, social and 
legal ground rules that administer political and 
economic activity 
Williamson, 
Coase 
Institutional 
arrangement 
between formal 
and informal 
institutions 
Agreements made by specific individuals to govern 
their own relationships. This arrangement is the 
institutions of governance - include contracts and 
organizations and in distinctive the business firms. 
Williamson, 
Coase 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Concerned with understanding how variations on 
certain basic characteristics of transactions lead to the 
diverse organizational arrangements 
North Economic 
history and 
growth 
To explain for the evolution of political and economic 
institutions that create an economic environment that 
induces increasing productivity 
 
 
 
 
New 
Institutional 
Sociology 
(NIS) 
DiMaggio 
and Powell;   
- Institutional 
fields 
 
 
An aggregate of organizational in the field that 
represent a recognized area social life. A structurally 
equivalent and interconnected organizations in the 
same environment. E.g., national industries, oil 
company, universities, and consulting firms.  
DiMaggio 
and Powell;   
- Institutional 
mechanisms 
Constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same 
set of environmental conditions". Types of 
isomorphism: competitive and institutional, 
"organizations compete not just for resources and 
customers, but for political power and institutional 
legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness". 
Agency 
theory 
Eisenhardt - Trust 
- Legitimacy 
- Information 
asymmetry 
Offers a unique insight into information systems, 
outcome uncertainties, and risks. And empirical valid 
perspectives, especially when coupled with 
complementary perspective. Can incorporate an 
agency perspective in the studies of many problems 
having a cooperative structure.   
 
I believe that the triangulation of theories will help me to understand the phenomena in a more 
holistic way and fully communicate the current level of involvement of national firms in RDTL 
in state infrastructure projects.  
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Chapter 3.0 Methodology 
This chapter presents a combination of techniques applied to gather empirical data and justifies 
utilized analyses techniques. This is a qualitative case study and it applies a constructivist 
approach. Main data sources are semi-structured interviews, official documents and other 
relevant secondary data. The validity and reliability issues are addressed in the end of this 
chapter. 
This chapter continues with a very brief presentation of the chosen philosophical position where 
ontological and epistemological assumptions are discussed.  
 
3.1 The philosophy of the research 
Easterby-Smith et al., (2012) identified reasons for understanding the philosophy of research. 
Firstly, the understanding is needed to clarify the research design, by considering what kind of 
evidence is required and how it should be gathered and further interpreted; and also how the 
answers will be obtained to answer the research questions. Secondly, limitations of particular 
approaches are indicated, and created designs may go beyond the researcher’s past experience.  It 
also provides the researcher with a frame which guides how to adapt research designs according 
to the constraints of different knowledge structures. Thus, the purpose of a scientific research is 
to increase our understanding of the phenomenon and enable the changes (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). 
To achieve that, one should first identify ontological and epistemological assumptions the 
research is based upon. “Ontology is about the nature of reality and existence” (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2012, p. 17), and is relying on the beliefs of humans of what is real and what is illusion and 
what is considered to be the truth. The ontologies of different philosophies differ. While realists 
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consider only single truth exists, nominalists on the other side of scale, consider that there is no 
one truth. This study is closer to the relativist approach. For relativists there is no single truth, but 
the truth that is rather working in the current context. Their position enables us to explore the 
views of different respondents on the same phenomenon and conclude whether their 
understanding of it differs due to their beliefs in what constitutes the truth. 
“Epistemology is about different ways of inquiring into the nature of the physical and social 
worlds.” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 21). Roughly, two polar positions exist here. Positivists 
believe in the existence of external social world and that objective methods should be utilized to 
measure it. Social constructivists believe that social world cannot be objectively measured and 
cannot exist separately. Every person constructs its own social reality and can only be measured 
subjectively (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). This research is based on semi-structured interviews 
where the meaning of the respondents on the given phenomenon is investigated. Thus, this 
research is closer to the social constructivism approach, due to the differences in the perceptions 
of the reality by respondents. Our interest lies in revealing, examining and explaining why these 
differences occur rather than finding the ultimate truth.   
 
3.2 A qualitative approach – advantages and limitations 
Qualitative research attempts to capture subjective understanding of the external world from the 
perspective of interviewees/participants and abandons the task of representing an objective 
unchanging external reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 158). This approach was chosen for 
the following reasons. First, in a creative process, the qualitative approach aims to give and 
understanding of the sense that respondents make of their world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). I 
have been capturing different understandings of the same infrastructural project in Timor-Leste 
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from the different points of view of different interviewees. Secondly, the descriptive nature of 
this thesis presents the discussion of the process of the government contracting mechanism and 
deep understanding of particular chosen case from a holistic perspective. The research questions 
addressed are not opening for the quantitative research nor accurate measurements and repetition 
of events in future with the foreseen outcome. The use of semi-structured interviews gives a 
chance of both obtaining the information that was planned by the researcher as well as it opens 
for discussions and findings outside of the “box” that can come spontaneously from the 
respondent. I believe that conducting these interviews face-to-face has given a high valuable data 
for this study, kept me constantly challenged and revising the chosen theories and perceptions of 
the contracting phenomenon, thus involving me into reflexive thinking under way, according to 
the recommendations of Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000). Qualitative method has given me the 
freedom to modify my approach under way in order to get a deeper understanding of how the 
national government in RDTL is utilizing the contracting regime and involving the national 
companies. In a developing country like Timor-Leste, I was constantly exposed to new and 
exciting information about the current case, previous experience of interviewees, and other 
knowledge, which enriched this study and made the presentation of the process as holistic as 
possible. Some improvements have been made on the way. One could have never achieved this 
quality with merely means of survey or quantitative approach. 
3.3 Data collection method 
3.3.1 Primary data 
16 semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the initially chosen interviewees in the 
RDTL during February-March 2015. Among the informants are higher level government 
officers, representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries and managers of national 
24 
 
and international private firms. The choice has been made due to their links and interests in the 
Tasi-Mane project. More specifically the respondents come from: Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources (MPMR), Office of the former Prime Minister (Director for National Agency 
of Development (NAD) and Procurement Commissioners). During the time when interviews 
were undergoing there was a reshuffle in the government which NAD and National Procurement 
Commission (NPC) moved under the Ministry of Planning and Strategic Investment; Ministry of 
Public Works, Transportation and Telecommunication; State Institute for the Support of Micro 
and Medium Enterprise Development (IADE) under the  Ministry of State, Coordinating 
Minister of Economic Affairs. On the other side, I interviewed both international and local 
companies and a Non-Government Organization associated with Tasi-Mane project and the 
Chamber of Commerce. Most of the interviews have been performed in the capital of the country 
– Dili. The usual process included contacting the potential respondent by phone or email with the 
following meeting at the suitable time for the respondent. Some interviews have been made in 
the province where the Tasi-Mane project is undergoing, which is approximately 6 hours away 
from the Capital. More detailed information about the informant’s position, place and the 
duration of interview can be found in appendix 1.  
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
This research attempts to illustrate the inter ministry responsibility and relationships over the 
Tasi-Mane infrastructure project and the utilization of a contractual mechanism and decisions 
around it. In order to obtain a trustworthy information semi structured interviews have been 
utilized. Having structure gives the opportunity of guiding the respondents in the direction that is 
wanted to be obtained in the interview also assuring that the necessary information will be given 
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as well as giving the opportunity for respondents to freely express their thoughts. This enriches 
the predefined questions with more relevant facts, stories and life-line experiences.  
The candidates for interviews were carefully chosen. All the informants from government have 
the authority to provide the accurate information based on their position, practices and 
experiences and existing procedures. Historically, they have been involved into the planning 
process and development of Tasi-Mane project both individually and institutionally. See 
appendix 2 for guide questions in the English Language. Interviews have been performed in both 
the English language and in the local language – Tetum. Interviews have further been transcribed 
into the English Language by independent authorized translator. I have checked the tape and the 
transcription in order to ensure the quality of the translation and transcription as well as asked 
two independent researchers to check some of the English transcriptions. 
3.3.3 Secondary data 
Gathering secondary data in Timor-Leste is a challenging process. Very limited internet access 
and no public library make it difficult to get insight in the secondary data sources. However, for 
this study public governmental papers have been accessed, as well as historical documents and 
statistics. These sources have been produced for the different purposes of internal and external 
use and are therefore treated with care. Therefore, it is essential to let the research questions 
guide and frame the data (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010). The published data aims to provide 
transparency to the contracting process. The examples of documents include public laws, 
regulations and guidelines, strategic development plan and National Development Plan and 
reports from relevant NGOs. Some information has also been studied through the local press and 
both national and international newspapers. 
26 
 
3. 4 Data analysis 
Three interconnected theoretical frameworks are applied as lenses for this study and used to 
analyze the result of the transcribed interviews and relevant secondary sources in order to answer 
the stated research questions. In the process of data collection, I have constantly analyzed the 
incoming data and measured them against my research objectives and goal. This has also guided 
the choice of important points and selection of the citations as well as guided the forming of the 
empirical findings and following conclusions. 
The findings have been extracted from the transcribed interviews and analyzed through the 
lenses of chosen theories and obtained meaningful conclusions from it. To condense highly 
complex and context-bound information into a format which tells a story in a way that is fully 
convincing to others is a common issue for a qualitative researcher (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, 
p. 162).  Moreover, it goes beyond the requirement of “good journalism” where sources are well 
referenced and “interpretations” are balanced. Following the Easterby-Smith et al., (2012) 
recommendations I have tried to present the content in a coherent way and present the analysis in 
a convincing way and findings in a chronological order, intuitively understandable. 
3. 5 Validity and reliability 
Research is ineffective, becomes belles’ letters or fiction, and loses its utility without rigor 
(Morse et al., 2002). In their study Morse et al., (2002) argue that in order to achieve rigor in a 
qualitative research, it is necessary that the issues of validity and reliability are addressed in the 
study. They further argue that researcher in qualitative research should regain which having 
responsibility for validity and reliability by executing strategic integral of accuracy or 
verification and self-correcting during conducting inquiry. To attain quality research it basically 
refers to the fundamental question of “how can inquirer persuade his or her audiences that 
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research findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to” Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 290). 
Also presented in (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 157) researcher should keep in mind the 
relevance that research has to the respondents. In this study three theories are utilized as well as 
different sources of information. This data and theories triangulation gives the opportunity of 
building a more holistic picture of the phenomena, thus increasing validity and reliability, 
obtaining information from both public and private informants strengthens the research. The 
amount of interviews is sufficient to reach the saturation.  
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Chapter 4.0 The local context  
4.1 Presentation of the research case (Tasi-Mane) 
Timor-Leste have recently found oil and is wanting to use it in a proper way to build the national  
economy, however  the infrastructure is weak and needs to be improved. Due to this, a Tasi-
Mane project has been developed and is currently under construction. 
Tasi-Mane (Male Sea - the Tetum name for the Timor Sea between Timor-Leste's south coast 
and Australia) is the name for the centerpiece of the Timor-Leste Government's development 
strategy as corridor for petroleum infrastructure along the southwest coast of the country. 
According to (Government, 2011)  Strategic Development Plan (SDP) and development Program 
of 2012-2017, the petroleum infrastructures in Tasi – Mane on the South Coast will be developed 
in order to provide adequate petro hub infrastructures in the region. The project consists of three 
clusters and aims to give an economic boost to the municipalities and country as a whole. 
Government believes that the industrial clusters will provide support for the petroleum industry 
by establishing proper infrastructures. The three clusters include a Beaço Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) plant, Betano Refinery and Petrochemical cluster and lastly the Suai Supply base which 
involves the building of a new highway and establishment of new airport - Suai.  
The Beaço LNG plant cluster is the area where the natural gas pipeline from the Timor Sea 
(mainly from Greater Sunrise gas field) will reach Timor-Leste main land and where TIMOR 
GAP E.P will build an LNG plant to process the gas. This cluster will integrate the LNG Plant 
Complex and a marine facility to enable loading and downloading of goods. In addition, an old 
airport in Municipality of Viqueque will be upgraded to the adequate capacity to serve as a 
regional airport and provide daily service for LNG plant operations.  
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The Betano cluster complex is an industrial place with refinery and petrochemical industries, 
along with a petroleum industry administration city (Nova Betano). The refinery will provide 
different forms of fuel such as diesel, gasoline, jet-fuel, and LPG for domestic consumption. In 
long run, it is considered as a source of increasing the Timorese trading in petroleum (oil and 
gas) products, huge amount of the refinery product will be sold to foreign markets.  According to 
Timor Gap, E.P. refinery capacity is estimated at 30,000 barrels per day (bpd). The new 
administration cities will provide robust jobs for the South Coast people and offer social services 
and housing. According to government, the building of petrochemical area and refinery will be 
arranged in the form of working together or cooperation between private and public sectors  
Suai Supply Base (SSB) industrial cluster has been part of the Government's public vision 
since early 2008. The project includes building of the following facilities: sea port (breakwater 
and jetties), storage yard, heavy metal workshop, ship building, repair facilities, warehouses, 
offices, fuel tank farm, housing complex and industrial park. In short, it is an entry point for the 
equipment and materials to establish petro industries infrastructures. Therefore, Timor-Leste 
through its national oil company Timor Gap E.P will build and operate a logistics supply base in 
the Suai municipality to support all offshore oil and gas activities in the Timor-Leste Exclusive 
Area (TLEA) and the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA). This is an avenue for the Tasi 
- Mane area to build a petroleum sector domestically which is capable to link facilities for 
business and industry. According to Timor Gap, E.P, the Council of Ministers (CoM) has 
awarded Suai Supply Base (SSB) to Hyundai Group from South Korea and the construction of 
supply base is expected to start in 2015.  
A highway, which aims to connect all three clusters, will be built in this area. Its distance is 156 
km. The highway is projected with a speed limit for up to 100 km/h in flat areas and 60 km/h in 
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mountain areas, and will reduce total travel time from Suai to Beaço to less than 2 hours, against 
6 hours today.  According to government, the road will be built in four stages, according to the 
industries growth and economic necessity. This road project has been awarded to Covec, Chinese 
Company that has started to build this project in 2015 and will finish in 2020.  
PT. Waskita Karya (Persero) Tbk. from Indonesia has been awarded to build the Suai Airport. 
The Suai Airport will allow the safe operation of light airplanes and helicopters to support 
petroleum activities. Rehabilitation and extension works were launched in May 2014 where the 
runway will be extended to 1,500m and will cater to fixed-wing (20-50 seats) aircraft and 
helicopters with passenger capacity of 15/20. To see where the project is situated, the Timor-
Leste map with Tasi-Mane cluster project locations’ is presented below in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Map of Tasi-Mane cluster project locations. Source: Timor Gap E.P, 2014. 
 
4.2 National Oil Company Timor Gap 
Timor Gap, E.P, a National Oil Company, received a mandate from the council of ministries 
through Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR) to administer and manage the 
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day to day activities for the implementation of the Tasi-Mane three cluster projects. Historically, 
the idea for the Timor-Leste to have a National Oil Company (NOC) is based on its Petroleum 
Act. When the Petroleum Act was enacted as Law No. 2005/13 ten years ago, one of the most 
important changes was the addition of Article 22 "State Participation in Petroleum Operations," 
which allows a state-owned National Oil Company  to participate in joint ventures for exploring 
and exploiting petroleum resources in Timor-Leste. In addition, Article 8 of the Model 
Production Sharing Contract under the Petroleum Act also allows an NOC to become a partner in 
petroleum exploration in Timor-Leste's exclusive areas, with up to a 20% share (Journal da 
República, 2005). The decree-law to create Timor-Leste's NOC was only approved on 25th of 
May 2011, by the Council of Ministers and two month later on the 20th July 2012, the President 
promulgated the decree-law as it was published as Decree-Law No. 31/2011 (Journal da 
República, 2011), and the NOC name’s was changed to what we know today as TIMOR GAP – 
Timor Gas & Petroleum, E.P. (Empresa Publica). The Council of Ministers and President 
approved the legislation after extensive discussion on how TIMOR GAP would relate to the 
Petroleum Fund. Government created TIMOR GAP mainly to provide an avenue for the state to 
act as an entrepreneur in order to have business stake from its petroleum industry. Other reason 
for establishment is to build high quality human resources and national expertise in order to 
participate and own, in other word for the purposes of holding and managing, the assets owned 
by the State of Timor-Leste in the petroleum sector assigned by law. 
The upstream business activities such as exploration and production, including provision of 
services, both onshore and offshore, within or outside of the national territory, are entrusted to 
TIMOR Gap by government. The TIMOR Gap is also entrusted with the carrying out of 
downstream business activities, including the storage, refining, processing, distribution and sale 
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of petroleum and its by-products, as well as natural gas and any other hydrocarbons, and also the 
industrial processing of petroleum by-products and the carrying out of other activities in the 
petrochemical industry. Currently, Timor Gap has two subsidiaries. In 2013, Timor Gap has 
signed its first Production Sharing Contract (PSC) as a 24% partner in a joint venture for area 11-
106 in the Joint Petroleum Development Area. The rest of the project is operated by the Italian 
company Eni, which owns 40.53%, and the Japanese company Inpex owns 35.47% (ANP, 2013). 
The structure of the company is presented below in Figure 3 Timor Gap E.P. Structure, Source: 
Timor Gap E.P (2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Timor Gap E.P. Structure, Source: Timor Gap E.P (2014).  
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actors on all levels and are involved in project development, contract negotiations and day to day 
implementation of different projects.  
 
4.3 The dual purpose of Timor Gap’s Tasi - Mane project   
“I want our oil to be used to create our own industry and to provide jobs for Timorese people” Teacher, Hatulia, 
Ermera Municipality, National Consultation, July 2010 (Government of Timor-Leste, 2011). 
The key pillar of Timor – Leste future development is its petroleum sector which is designated in 
its Strategic Development Plan (Government of Timor-Leste, 2011).  The Timorese government 
and most of the politicians believe that the petroleum sector crucial for the growth of the country 
and employment of the young generation. In developing of this sector, Timorese government 
strategy is to make sure and enable its natural resources to be used to build the nation and 
support its own people. Moreover, the Timorese government’s vision has always been to 
minimize the unemployment rate by creating jobs through industries opportunities. Developing 
petroleum infrastructures and increasing access to oil and natural gas will absolutely create jobs 
and growth of economy. In particular, it is expected the increase of regional businesses and 
supply services. Timorese government believe that the Tasi - Mane project will have influence 
on other industries and services, employment, scope of expertise both locally, regionally and 
nationally.  Furthermore, the municipalities will receive property taxes from the plant in addition 
to increased personal taxes, which will lead to increased public spending. 
To sum up, the Timorese petroleum industry is developed with a mission of maximum 
participation of Timorese citizens and businesses (Government of Timor-Leste, 2011). 
Government believes that this is a better way of development, than simply selling the oil and gas 
overseas. 
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Chapter 5.0 Findings and analysis  
5.1 Findings 
5.1.1 Development/changing the contractual regime during 2002 to 2015   
In order to understand the current contractual situation and involvement of the national firms in 
the current infrastructure projects historical background should be discussed as well. In this study 
I will look closer on the previous 13 years (between 2002 and 2015), since the independence of 
RDTL. This period is credible to study the formation of mechanisms and institutions to better 
understand the situation today. 1999-2001 was a transitional period, where UN forces helped to 
establish the structure of a new country. Self-governance has started from 2002. Current 
government continues implementing the 2011-2030 SDP and therefore Tasi-Mane project is 
adopting previous contractual regimes as well.  
We can define three different eras in which the contractual regimes have been changing. At the 
very beginning, the country was destroyed and the political and economic situation was poor 
and unstable. The basic infrastructure was almost absent and the country has literally stood up 
from ashes. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically. During the post-referendum time, 
after the August 1999, the country faced the absence of functioning organizational institutions. 
At this time a lot of international donors like United Nations have been helping to rebuild the 
country promoting political, social and economic recovery. Thus, the nation was led by the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from the end of 1999 to 
mid-2002. UN was governing the territory, exercised the executive and legislative authority 
through this period and building capacity to support the government in further self-governance. 
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The contract regime in this period was administrated by the UNTAET with the regulation 
number 2000/7 and the regulation number 2000/101. 
The second stage was the first self-governance period which started in 2002 until 2007. This 
period characterizes with a country that receives full financial support from both multilateral and 
bilateral development partners due to the absence of both state and private investments. Though 
the people were proud of the first independent government, it faced a lot of challenges. The 
government’s focus on stage was building the basics of governance system, as well as education, 
and health systems and basic infrastructure. Economically, it has been placed as one of the 
poorest countries in the world, with an average income per capita of $0.52 in 2001 and $0.88 in 
2007 (TLSLS, 2008). In this period the government successfully agreed upon the joint 
development of petroleum offshore field with Australian government which provided the country 
with savings in a petroleum fund for about 16 billion USD. At the time, government of Timor-
Leste still utilized the inherited contracting regimes from UNTAET. The new contractual regime 
was developed in 2005, where all the public procurement was placed under the administration of 
Ministry of Finance. Government created several decree laws: the procurement legal regime, 
administrative infractions of the procurement, judicial regime and public contracts legal regime.  
These arrangements were developed to carry out some of the constructions and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure projects at that time. The development of economy and important milestones of 
2002-2015 as well as historical development of important legislative work for the contractual 
regime in Timor-Leste is presented in (Figure 4 Developments of Timor-Leste Contracting Regimes 
below: 
  
                                                           
1
 Regulation No. 2000/7 on the establishment of a legal tender for East Timor and Regulation No.2000/10 on public 
procurement for civil administration in East Timor; available at; http://www.jornal.gov.tl/lawsTL/UNTAET-
Law/Regulations%20English/regenglish.htm 
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Figure 4 Developments of Timor-Leste Contracting Regimes. 
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In 2006 Timor-Leste faced a turbulent year of a new political and military crisis. Many people 
lost their houses and country experienced a large amount of internal displaced persons ( IDP) 
living in barracks, as well as rebels movement and an attempt of  and civil unrest caused many 
losses of the houses, hundreds of thousands Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) were living under 
the barracks, rebels movement and till an attempt of assassination of the President. As result of 
this political crisis the first Prime Minister DR. Mari Alkatiri resigned2. 
The third stage covers 2007 to 2015 when the new Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão 
comes to power. His government was able to regain the political and military stability and 
addressed the outstanding and remaining political fractions, military and social problems, and 
solved IDPs and veterans issues at the time. In this era, the petroleum fund has been stated in an 
annual state budget and the funds used to solve some social and economic problems and provide 
funding for several basic infrastructure projects.  
In 2008 government made changes in procurement regime by taking into consideration the recent 
development of the country. At that time the growth was mainly explained by the state sponsored 
investment in infrastructures. It was promoted a decentralization of the procurement authority 
role from Ministry of Finance to other ministries3. The first country’s international infrastructure 
project – providing electricity - started in 2008 where state investments have been remarkably 
high and accounts for 57 percent (World Bank & MoF, 2015). During this period, bridges and 
roads also have been built and Tasi-Mane project have also started.  
From 2008 to 2011, government tries to push the economy to grow rapidly. In 2010 the 
procurement legal regime was changed in order to facilitate the development of sub-district level 
                                                           
2
 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006 
available at; http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf 
3
 Decree law no. 24/ 2008 of changing the procurement legal regime,  available at; https://www.mof.gov.tl/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/Decree_Law_24_2008_EN.pdf 
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projects, with the objective to build a robust local development, promoting knowledge and 
accountability through the contracting of construction works to local companies, in order to 
encourage the development of their companies, to increase the performance.  
Hence, since 2008 to 2011 Timor-Leste has achieved average double-digit economic growth of 
11.9%. One of the reasons for that has been the maintaining of economic stability from 2008 and 
prudent fiscal management4. However, the banking and financial service systems, especially 
access to credit and loans have not been enhanced and are currently close to be absent. 
In 2010, Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão introduced the summary of Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) in Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting. One year later in 2011 
the SDP launched a 20 years strategic plan for Timor-Leste, lasting from 2011- 2030. Hence, the 
SDP plan aims Timor-Leste to become an upper-middle income country, with a secure, well-
educated and healthy population, by 2030. SDP presents and argues that the four key national 
attributes of political will, economic potential, national integration and a dynamic population will 
underpin the achievement of this vision. With infrastructure development, economic 
development and social capital as the main three pillars. In relation to SDP and to support its 
implementation, the major contractual arrangements have changed dramatically in 2011 
compared to previous years. The government established infrastructure fund and its 
organizational institution such as: Administration Board of Infrastructure Fund (CAFI) and 
Major Project Secretariat (MPS) to manage and approve for the funds, in addition, government 
approved and established a procurement entity called National Procurement Commission (NPC) 
and National Development Agencies (NDA) as infrastructures supervision and quality control 
bodies. All these institutions were established under the council of ministries supervision to 
                                                           
4
  Statement by the Spokesperson of the IV Constitutional Government on April 8, 2010. Available at government 
portal; http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=2507&lang=en&lang=en 
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make sure that projects which value exceeds one million USD within infrastructure fund will 
meet high quality (World Bank and MoF, 2015). With the increased number of bigger projects 
the presence of international multi companies in the country increased as well. Hence, with the 
growing amount of international projects, the government has also engaged and established the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI-TL) in 2010 as a partner in development of 
infrastructures. In addition to this, during this period the Timorese firms have established a 
national consortium (CNT) with the objective to take a part in the development of infrastructure 
projects within the SDP scope. In 2011, the government established the national oil company, 
Timor Gap E.P, and one year later after reelection of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral resources (MPRM) was established. This ministry acts as a 
project owner of Tasi.Mane project and through Timor Gap it manages and organizes the day to 
day activities. After 2012 the contract regimes have not had any significant change. The only 
significant change, happened in 2015, is that NPC includes 25-35 percent participation of local 
or national firms in the terms of contracts within the Tasi-Mane supply base clusters.  
To add, in the approved 2015 state budget, $441 million was allocated to the development of 
major infrastructures, while $516 million was allocated for goods and services which include 
building of petroleum infrastructure supporting projects in Tasi-Mane.  The government has 
planned to spend more than US$3 billion on infrastructure development in the period from 2014 
to 2018, with roads, Tasi-Mane development and other transport being the three largest 
programs. These major infrastructure projects have been funded by the Timor-Leste 
infrastructure fund and loan from Asian Development Bank as well as from other bilateral 
cooperation (World Bank and MoF, 2015). 
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5.1.2 Key actors in the Tasi-Mane cluster project 
This part shortly illustrates the development of the Tasi-Mane cluster projects from 2011 to 
2015. A greater attention is paid to the key groups of government and business protagonists that 
have influenced the development of Tasi-Mane cluster projects. These actors consist of Council 
of Ministries (CoM), CAFI, and MPMR; line Ministries for example; MPWTC, MPS, AND, 
NPC, Timor Gap Ep., International contractors, CCI-TL/business association and national 
contractors. Their roles and relations among them are presented in figure 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Main government, business, and public agents molding the development of the Tasi-
Mane cluster project (the condition at the very beginning of 2011, authors own interpretation). 
 
NPC 
International 
contractors 
Chamber of 
Commerce & 
Industries 
(CCI)/Business   
Association 
Council of Ministries (CoM) or 
CAFI 
NDA 
MPMR 
Timor Gap EP 
Line 
Ministries 
MPS 
National contractors & CNT 
41 
 
5.1.2.1 Council of Ministers (CoM) and CAFI 
Today the Council of Ministers constitutes of 17 Ministers which are led by Prime Minister 
(within VI constitutional government) and have the right to vote in the meetings. This 
government body has the legislative power and makes important decisions in connection with the 
program development of the country. Since each cluster project in Tasi-Mane exceeds $5 
million; according to the decree law number 8/2011 about entities entitled to authorize 
procurement procedures,  CoM is the one who has competence in giving the final approval. They 
already approved the Suai Airport, Highway, Supply Base clusters and other projects that have 
been carried out by the international firms. 
The Administration Board of the Infrastructure Fund (CAFI) is composed of ministries 
representatives with some permanent members such as the Prime Minister as a chair, Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Infrastructures (MPWTC), who have competence according to decree 
law number 8/2011 to approve the projects from infrastructure fund between $1 million to $5 
million USD. CAFI is responsible to guarantee security in the negotiation process and 
contracting of Tasi-Mane multi-year projects and ensure the financing of Tasi-Mane project. 
The Major Project Secretariat (MPS) is created under the decree law number 8/2011 to 
perform the preliminary and formal appreciation concerning the Tasi-Mane project, when Tasi-
Mane was developed; MPS is responsible for review of the whole project including conducting 
its socio-economic studies since Tasi-Mane is categorized as major project. When MPS finishes 
the review process the project is passed further for verifying to NDA and to NPC to process the 
biddings.   
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5.1.2.2 National Development Agency (NDA) 
NDA is responsible for rationalizing the available financial resources through a rigorous 
assessment of the projects, based on a cost-benefit analysis, and controlling for the cost and 
quality of capital development of Tasi-Mane cluster projects. Originally NDA is placed under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister that integrates the direct administration of the State. In new 
government structure NDA has moved to newly established Ministry of Planning and Strategic 
Investment. Under the government decree law number 11/2011, NDA is responsible for 
reviewing the merits and feasibility of capital development projects, supervising, verifying and 
certifying capital development projects, as well as their execution, in coordination with the 
relevant ministry (Journal da República, 2011).   
 
5.1.2.3 National Procurement Commission (NPC) 
The national procurement commission is a procurement entity that is responsible to provide 
better procurement services to Timor Gap E.P, MPMR and MPWTC to Tasi-Mane cluster 
project and other large infrastructure projects, as well as achieving transparency for the Tasi-
Mane procurement process. The purpose of the NPC is to carry out procurement procedures for 
projects worth at least one million dollars as well as to monitor and provide technical assistance 
to other procurement procedures done within the scope of all public entities. Provide technical 
assistance and advisory to procurement procedures up to one million dollars and to collaborate 
with the National Development Agency, the Large Projects Secretariat, ministries and other 
public entities according to the law number 14/2011 (Journal da República, 2011).   
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5.1.2.4 MPMR and Timor Gap 
Timor Gap as a national oil company has received responsibilities from the Timor-Leste 
government via MPMR to manage and administer day to day Tasi-Mane petroleum industries 
project activities. It is also responsible for petroleum downstream projects which have interest of 
gaining experience as well commercial and economic interest. In this regard, MPMR is the 
owner of the project and Timor Gap is representing them and coordinates other actors such as 
international contractors, and CCI-TL. Therefore, Timor Gap also has a role in shaping a 
contractual regime in the context of Tasi-Mane clusters project. According to the data that I 
collected Timor Gap has acted according to their merits and expertise and have provided advice 
for NPC and international contractors. One of the advices was to include the participation of 
local companies at 20-30 percent of the contracts.  
 
5.1.2.5. International Contractors 
These are the group of international firms that participated in bidding process and won the 
projects. All of them can be characterized as competent construction companies that have 
sufficient financial sources, equipment and relevant experience. For example: PT. Waskita 
Karya, Tbk from Indonesia is building the Suai Airport; Chinese Company Covec is developing 
a highway; Hyundai Group - HDEC-HEC-AMCO Consortium (Korea) - Hyundai Engineering & 
Construction Co. Ltd / Hyundai Engineering Co. Ltd / Hyundai Amco Co. Ltd from Korea are 
building the Suai Supply Base. Many international contractors that have got contracts are 
currently undertaking preparations and conducting environmental studies. For example Waskita 
Karya has been working in Timor-Leste in building roads, bridges and other building during the 
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occupation period. Waskita Karya provides the training and learning of skills related to 
constructions and management to the local and national firms. 
 
5.1.2.6 Chamber of Commerce and Industries Timor-Leste (CCI-TL) and National 
Contractors 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Timor – Leste (CCI-TL) is the foremost Chamber of 
Commerce and an umbrella organization representing business associations in Timor-Leste. 
CCI-TL has branches in municipalities, including 3 municipalities located in the Tasi-Mane 
cluster projects area. CCI-TL was established following the National Congress proposition in 
2010. The objective of CCI-TL is to represent the needs of its members in policy advocacy and 
deliver a range of business services to enhance the skills, knowledge and performance of the 
national businesses it represents to achieve private sector growth. Since Tasi-Mane project 
developed, CCI-TL has joined with 19 members of associations and organizations where most of 
its members operate in civil constructions and public works. One of CCI-TL member 
associations is national Timorese consortium (CNT) which is composed of strong national 
construction firms who leverage their resources in terms of equipment, finance and management 
to handle larger projects like port, bridge, road and larger buildings. CNT have experienced 
building the first large bridge (Comoro) in cooperation with Indonesian state construction 
company Wijaya Karya (Wika) in 2012. Companies situated in the Tasi-Mane areas are also 
potential partners and sub-contractors that may benefit from international firms. These national 
contractors have experience in construction of roads, bridges and buildings with very basic 
equipment and limited personnel in terms of engineers and skilled staffs. Many of these national 
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firms have formed joint ventures to leverage resources and capacity to handle larger projects in 
Tasi-Mane area in the future. 
 
5.2 Interview results  
The interviews have revealed a number of problems that government authorities, international 
firms and national firms have experienced through the contracting process and a number of 
suggestions in order to minimize them have been proposed by respondents. In order to present 
the holistic picture of the process and development of Tasi-Mane project I will present the 
findings in the following order. First, I concentrate on the revealed barriers that hinder the 
successful contracting process. Secondly, I present the goals that Timor-Leste government set up 
for the facilitation and maintenance of big infrastructure projects. Thirdly, I present the processes 
that are implemented today. Finally I present some of the suggestions that arose in the interviews 
with the respondents on how they see the development of big infrastructure projects should 
undergo in order to involve the national firms and achieve the goals the government sets to itself. 
 
5.2.1 Barriers 
To answer the aim of this research, this chapter is divided in several sections. Firstly, there is 
amount of barriers and problems that national firms possess themselves that hinder them from 
active participation in the Tasi-Mane project. Secondly, there are barriers that government has 
introduced and that appear to be unfavorable to the national firms. Thirdly, there are challenges 
for international firms in terms of recruiting national subcontractors.   
One of the problems revealed in terms of national firms is lack of competence and knowledge.  
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This refers to lack of education, training and experience from both firms and employees in these 
firms in Timor-Leste. The current situation is a result of previous lack of education. At the same 
time there is a lack of vocational training centers that provide skills for people to meet market 
needs, especially in construction projects. Construction works in Tasi-Mane have different 
difficulty starting from the land clearance to sophisticated engineering work; hence people with 
different skills are required in different levels of construction project. In fact, there have been 
several vocational trainings, and university courses, however their capacity is small. Timor-Leste 
national firms faced this issue when they participated in the bidding process and when they 
formed joint ventures with international firms. In many cases government was not giving the 
priority to national participants.  International firms lack trust in national firms due to pervious 
negative experience, which revealed lack of understanding and experience. The same issue is 
right for the bidding process, where national firms get worse scores in experience, knowledge in 
constructing a supply base, airport and highway constructions.  
National firms on their hand have pointed that the current banking system is not allowing for 
obtaining a guarantee needed for the bidding process nor investments for the development. A 
respondent stated that: 
“The local businesses find it very difficult to get credit line, to be able to start a contract, so 
when the government awards a big contract, the payment may not come until some of the work 
or the whole job is completed. But you have to spend a lot of money before that, so the company 
who wins the contract must have a credit line from a bank to be able to remain the milestones, to 
start building before the payment comes, and that’s a very useful way of operating. In Timor-
Leste, if you are a local business, it is very hard to get the credit come from the bank.” 
 
One of the findings is that national firms must have capital to fulfill requirements which is 1 
million USD in cash according to bidding requirements. Very few Timorese companies 
participate in the bidding rounds when they are open for international competitive bidding. The 
reasons for that are the lacks of money needed to proceed, being unavailable to borrow money or 
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get a guarantee in a bank. Banks express low trust in Timorese companies due to land and 
properties are not regulated sufficiently and other warranties issues. Timorese companies on their 
turn feel that the bureaucracy and criteria established by the Bank are too high and processing 
time is too long. The current situation with Timorese banks has not been taken into consideration 
by the national government in terms of specifications and requirements to potential contractors. 
National firms therefore complain to the lack of support and understanding as well as impossible 
requirements to fulfill.  Banks in Timor-Leste operate mainly in the capital – Dili. There are 
three foreign banks and one national commercial bank. 
On the other hand, government authorities have been pointing to the previous negative 
experiences with the national firms. It has been revealed, that after winning a tender and signing 
the contract, the national firms have sub-contracted the whole contract to the international firm 
with the reduced price. Thus the goal of the government in increasing of competence and 
experience of the national firms has been jeopardized. A member of government stated that:   
“It’s very sad that national companies sell their project in order to gain 10%. Government has 
projected that 10% is what they will get when they finish the work. If they take 10% and sell it to 
international firm, then how many percent that international firm will get after concluding the 
work? This will automatically decrease the quality of work”. 
 
From the previous projects, the national firms have not build the legitimacy and trust, therefore 
one of the reasons why none of the national firms got any part of the Tasi-Mane project is a 
problem of work morale. This issue has been taken up in many discussions both on political and 
civil society’s level that Timorese firms have not been implementing quality construction 
projects, even though the government has clear intentions to provide them small scale projects in 
order to build their capacity for handling bigger projects in future. 
However, when the national firms sell the projects to international firms they automatically 
reduce the quality of the project, due to international subcontractor will also want to gain some 
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profit and thus reduce the cost of the project through cheaper materials, labor and so on. In 
addition, international companies employ many foreigners and not Timorese employees, import 
equipment and do not produce ripple effects in local communities. Government authorities 
become suspicious and unwilling to make favorable conditions for national firms.   
Even when international firms want to subcontract or employ the locals to do the “easy” work 
like bearing stones, the lack of education and language skills, like the English language, makes it 
difficult to employ them. The country’s two official languages are Portuguese and Tetum. The 
last one has a number of dialects and differs from municipality to municipality. Thus one of the 
respondent’s states: 
“We have tried to solve some of the language issues; it seems to be a small problem but it is a 
very important problem because these people will have to become our employees and in oil and 
gas industry English is a basic language.” 
 
International firms face language difficulties when they enter the Timor-Leste business market. 
Lack of communication makes recruitment of local businesses and finding national partners 
challenging. 
Current government arrangements around the participation in the Tasi-Mane project are also less 
favorable for the national firms.  
In the pre-contracting period, the national law is not favoring the national firms to participate 
in bidding process.  As mentioned before, each project exceeding one million dollars should go 
to international competitive bidding. A respondent stated that:  
“the government has certain sealing and as for law, if it is more than 1 million then this project 
will advertise in ICB then we need to invite the international firms, now for this kind of projects 
was basically as designed building project and only ICB contractor can do this job”. 
 
The requirements for the amount of technical equipment, financial guarantees and relevant 
experience are not achievable for national firms today. Some of criteria are almost impossible to 
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overcome, that in their turn reveal an immature banking system rather than lack of interest from 
national firms. One of the respondents adds: 
“If we are talking very generally, for the projects less than 1 million USD we assume that locals 
can do that but more than 1 million, why the government turns to international bidding? Because 
the locals don’t have the capacity right now.” 
 
Also national and international firms have been mentioning that the process of making a final 
decision is not a transparent process. First of all, a number of ministries and departments 
involved in the contractual arrangements do not follow the recommendations of each other and 
make their own decisions during the process. Thus, one local entrepreneur experienced that the 
ranking of the bidders was not made according to the recommendations. The decision making 
process was unclear and not fully transparent, though government is involving competent 
international consultants in the choice process. Government on their side claims to follow the 
international rules in the bidding process. For example, one of the respondents, who have 
delivered the bid, a representative of a strong national firm, gave the following comment: 
“Charles Kendell and Partner/NPC, they are the ones who evaluate all these international 
tender criteria. They have done their work, but when it goes to CoM or CAFI that’s when things 
fail. I witnessed that when they came in, everything was working very nice in the tender 
processing, and then what can they do? They do not say that this is the winner; all they do is just 
sorting out and giving numbers to the potential contractors. For example number 1 with highest 
technical and financial characteristics, then number 2, number 3, 4, 5, 6. The government then 
decides. It is supposed to go to number one, logically speaking, but political intervention they 
will not give to number 1 they give it to number 6.” 
 
Other respondents made similar quotes and demand more transparent process to avoid 
misunderstandings. 
 
When it comes to the contracting period, the number of national firms that have been getting a 
contract in Tasi-Mane project over 1 million USD is equal to zero. That means that no national 
firm has got any contract solely or in collaboration with international firm through the tender 
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system so far. Therefore the opinion of international firms is provided here. International firms 
complain about the content of the contracts. They mean that contracts are too general and do not 
provide the information of what and how the planned infrastructure should be made.  
Also some national firms provided me with the information that the government does not possess 
enough expertise when ordering the materials and specifications in the contract. For example the 
area of Suai, according to one respondent has too soft ground for the flight to land and needs to 
be strengthened with other type of stones. However, the government is determined that the 
contractor should use the local stones found in the region, despite this fact was pointed to them. 
A respondent stated that: 
“the stones that are used in airport of Suai are aggregates for a runway, so when the plane lands 
the pressure that it gives in that moment, it’s impact is huge, so we have to have really good base 
of cutting a runway in order to make good investment and this material does not exist in that 
area. And the government said, no, you have to use that material, so it’s our obligation to 
explain you that if you use the product that is there it is not going to last long, you are going to 
spent more money maybe in five years to renew the runway again. So there is a good and bad 
side there, because the project is in Suai you must use everything from Suai, which is good for 
the local economy but when you talk about materials for the construction that will not 
necessarily work.” 
 
National firms complain to the lack of involvement and have recently forced the government to 
include the additional condition into the contracts, that 20-30 percent of the contract should be 
given to the national firms. However international firms state that the formulation is unclear 
whether the 20-30 percent should be employees or whether 20-30 percent of the contract should 
be subcontracted to the national firms. International firms, on their hand, have sent signals that if 
the contract will have more than 30 percent of national firms’ involvement their interest to 
participate decreases dramatically. It seems that the international firms do not have enough trust 
in the national firms of Timor-Leste and are not interested in subcontracting and educating them: 
“No specific local content implementation, but there is a term in the contract to include local 
companies, it is written in general term, and bidding document it is usually specified in the 
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methodologies of the works where we must involve local labor and how much. However it is not 
very specific whether you must hire Timorese people, and how much or you have to acquire 
goods and service in this percentage”. 
 
In Post contract period previous infrastructure projects have been experiencing some problems. 
For example several respondents mentioned the bridge project where the winning international 
firm has not been starting the building of the road in time due to some financial difficulties in a 
period of two years. A respondent stated that: 
“a road construction from Dili to Liquica, I think was around 30 million dollars, all the local 
companies have a bit of difficulties in meeting those criteria, so Spanish company met all the 
criteria and was hired, but then it took them two years to start, until the government actually told 
them, look, are you going to start or we are going to cancel the contract? And then the issue 
appeared that they were still looking for financing, so basically what is happening, you know, 
giving to foreign companies, because they meet all the criteria but the foreign company does not 
have the financial capacity to do the project. In the end they are now sub- contracting to local 
companies again”. 
 
International firms experience difficulties in transferring the needed equipment to the place 
where the project should be built. National firms that could have been sub-contractors do not 
possess the necessary equipment and knowledge to assist the international firm in this area. 
Local firms are hardly 10 years old and do not possess heavy equipment and cannot run a project 
like Tasi-Mane. In some cases, companies that possess heavy equipment lack knowledge to 
operate and maintain it. Therefore they are forced to look for an outsider that can operate it. In 
some cases equipment is rented from other companies. National companies are then often 
disqualified from biddings because at the evaluation round it is revealed that they do not possess 
adequate equipment and competent personnel. 
Another issue of the Timorese government is the lack of long term thinking. A big amount of 
finished projects has not been assigned to any department and stays without maintenance today. 
Thus, several roads have been damaged after reparation process was finished as well as 
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infrastructures which can no longer be used. Therefore, national firms reveal a doubt on who will 
maintain the Tasi-Mane project after it is built and whether it will replenish the treasury of 
decaying infrastructures in Timor-Leste. After the critics of national firms, government have 
included the current contracts that have awarded to International firms with maximum 3 year of 
maintenance including the period of deflection before government look after it: 
“The big problem in Timor-Leste is that we do not have money for maintenance, that’s why we 
see everywhere that the roads have narrowed  from the post-independence time until now, not 
only roads but also bridges do not have maintenance, once a small hole gets deeper, we are not 
going to rehabilitate it, but we built the new road construction”. 
  
The responsible body for the day to day operations – Timor Gap doesn’t have  any decision 
power whether to involve national firms or not. All the decisions are made by Ministry of 
Petroleum, CAFI and Council of Ministries. A member of staff from Timor Gap states: 
“…as a state oil company, we have been delegated the administration and management of the 
whole Tasi-Mane project on behalf of the government or the Ministry of Petroleum. So the 
government remains the owner of the program, but on day to day basis it is Timor Gap that 
administers and manages it.  Now, in the implementation of various sub-projects under Tasi-
Mane project, it will depend on the type of activities, and  project will be done through for 
instance one of which if it is construction we need to kind of invite the multinational companies 
to come and contracted out to be to essentially to do constructions work, the designing, the 
consultancy work are normally been outsourced and essentially Timor Gap for its part managing 
and for administer those activities on behalf of the government”. 
 
The summary of the key barriers in the contracting regime in Timor-Leste is presented in table 3. 
It is organized from the perspective of national, international companies and government 
authorities.    
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Table 3 Summary of key barriers of involving national firms in Tasi-Mane Project 
 
Goals of the national firms’ participation 
Different government authorities understand differently the goal for national firm’s participation 
in the Tasi-Mane project. While one part wants the competence building and active involvement 
of local firms, others are sceptic due to the difficulty and scale of the project. They have made 
some negative remarks as well.  
When we turn to firms, both national and international firms consider the participation of 
national firms in the Tasi-Mane project as important.  
Almost all CEOs of national firms, representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
officers argue that the participation of national companies is very crucial for local and national 
economic as well as for future possibility to become self-sufficient in terms of financial and 
technological development. Respondent states: 
 National firms Government International firms 
 
K
ey
 
ba
rr
ie
rs
 
• Lack of 
equipment/Machinery 
• Planning/division 
of project in sub-
projects 
• Language 
• Lack of knowledge, 
education 
• Bidding process 
organization and  
implementation 
• Problem with finding the 
local labor/ national firms 
(subcontracting) 
• Lack of financial guarantee 
from local banks 
• Difficulties in 
writing up a 
contract 
• Problems with contract – 
needs more development 
• Wrong enforcement/failure 
to comply with the 
conditions of the contract 
• Lack of 
enforcement 
• Time consuming to start 
the project 
• No guarantees given for the 
work done 
• Lack of national 
firms that are up 
to the standard 
• International companies 
are not interested if the % 
of local content is high 
• Low work morale • Business 
involvement 
• Employing more foreign 
staff compared to locals 
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“It is very important; Timorese can gain some money and knowledge too. And any infrastructure 
done by the government stimulates economy, so it is very important, so the main job of the 
government is to invest in infrastructure because we see there is an economic value”.  
 
Both national firms and Chamber of Commerce also expressed that to be part of the Tasi-Mane 
project can equip national firms to gain experiences and increase the competitiveness:  
“I think, this is good, because you will get the experience from all other companies who have 
been doing this work for a long time, what could be a shame? It would be if they came and did 
the project and left, and the Timorese businesses will be no better off. It will be better if we could 
do a part of contract to do the work and they actually would involve the Timorese businesses 
community and teach them. So when they leave, the Timorese businesses can step forward”. 
 
When it comes to government’s point of view, as a project owner, several government members 
do not understand why national firms should participate in Tasi-Mane project as they have their 
own view of the question. A member of government states: 
“Timorese must get more benefit and profit or money from this project. But it is a process, 
probably we have to wait until 10 years to get ready and probably within 10 year time some 
Timorese firms will be good enough”. 
 
In addition to this, several government officers revealed that it is good to involve national firms 
in the Tasi-Mane project which they think should be the whole purpose of the project. Capacity 
development, employment and business opportunities for Timorese can be realized within this 
project; however the Timorese firms should change their performance and behavior in order to 
be able to build their capacity over time: 
“Their participation is very important, if we don’t involve them then who is going to involve 
them if not this government? But national firms have to stop selling their projects, and start 
learning how to execute the project”. 
 
5.2.2 Means 
Several respondents expressed that to reach maximum participation of Timorese companies in 
Tasi-Mane project the government should have established state owned organization and 
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involved consultancy companies before they launch mega projects. In this case it might have 
secured the participation and knowledge transfer from international companies: 
“There are two ways to do the jobs; whether we need to relax the criteria in order to involve 
nationals, however we have already relaxed the criteria, we cannot relax more. Further, we need 
to build 2 or 3 big crown companies in this country so that they can do the job. Your country has 
only established one crown company so far, you can establish similar crown companies in 
construction, and consultancy companies whether it takes money, resources but the capacity will 
automatically increase”. 
 
Making the criteria more flexible and tailored to the local context and making bidding 
requirements easier for the national firms have been expressed by several respondents. It would 
increase the number of national firms to be eligible for tenders. The most successful national 
firms also expressed that they already possess the necessary equipment and human resources. 
However, they do have a constraint in form of lack of financial capability, and no possibility to 
obtain a guarantee from local banks.  According to them this is the government’s role to establish 
a bank for these purposes. 
“I think the government should be a little bit more flexible towards the local companies, I mean 
our government must understand that we are a new country, they must recognize that our 
companies were started from zero also in financial part. For example, foreign companies they 
did not have any trouble in getting financial support from the bank, like reference, like financial 
guarantee from foreign institute. For local company that is the most difficult part because there 
is no any institution here in Timor at the moment that can actually support the local companies, 
and that was one of the factors”. 
 
Several respondents from national firms and procurement body also mentioned that the 
government could provide some training in how to participate in bidding process and in project 
management to national firms in order to increase the experience and probability of the national 
firms to submit the necessary documents for tenders.   
Several respondents from the Chamber of Commerce and Industries agree with the national firms 
and propose that government should find the solutions on how to help the national companies to 
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lend money from the bank. Another task they see the banks are capable of providing to national 
firms is training, for example in terms of solving the property rights.   
 “in the short term, the banks that lend the money need more information from the Timorese 
businesses to give them some confidence that the money will be safe after being loaned until they 
are paid back and we need some more training for local businesses, so that they can provide the 
information to the banks, to be able to have some confidence to lend some money, and the 
government could accept a longer waiting process on letting contract to consortium that involves 
local business, so international business,  and local business have a stronger waiting to try to 
encourage the skill to have transferred. But in long term, property rights, that is single biggest 
barrier to get the businesses growing. Having existed to money to be able to grow and start up 
their businesses something that the banks can lend money” 
 
Several respondents have also expressed that government should be transparent in the whole 
process of procurement. National firms have been repeatedly saying that government sometimes 
does not consider technical part, sometimes the decision is made on fulfillment of requirements 
and sometimes on something else. They basically question how the process of procurement 
undergoes and want transparency at all stages. They consider the current process of project 
development and procurement to be too complicated. As a result many projects have not been 
executed properly and do not get appropriate maintenance.  
Finally, the respondents state the lack of coordination between the key stakeholders in the Tasi-
Mane project.  
5.3 Theoretical analysis and discussions of my findings 
In this chapter I analyze the data presented in the previous section with the following theories: 
new institutional economics (NIE), new institutional sociology (NIS) and agency theory. The 
historical development, relevant actors as well as their actions and influences will be discussed in 
order to reveal the factors that are enabling and hindering the national firms from participation in 
contractual arrangements like big infrastructure projects. Lastly this section concerns about the 
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actions undertaken by government in their efforts to balance short-term quality and speed of 
building of Tasi-Mane infrastructures versus long-term capacity building. 
 
5. 3.1 Development of contractual regime and political tendencies  
Timor-Leste’s politics and institutions pay an important role in understanding the degree of 
participation of national firms in Tasi-Mane project through its development of contractual 
regimes. As Williamson (2000) pointed that the institutional environment can cover a lot of 
ground, and that, its characteristics are very pivotal to analyses or investigations of the nation’s 
progress (North and Weingast, 1989). Thus, the main concern of economic history is to consider 
the change/evolution of economic and political institutions that initiate an economic environment 
which in turn increases productivity (North, 1991). This study covered the last 13 years (2002-
2015) of development of the contractual regimes in Timor - Leste and its economic development. 
These years have been turbulent for the country. It has been dependent on the international 
financial sources, as well as advisors and military forces. The government has been trying to 
adopt the best management practices from the western countries; however these were not 
translated to the current realities. For example, the government has been giving out contracts 
through ICB mechanism and set up the requirements for participation in it. However the 
immature banking system was not considered as well as challenges with the procurement law, 
which hinder the participation of national firms in ICB. Thus, only the government possesses 
enough resources to initiate big infrastructure projects. The ambitious plan of the Government of 
Timor-Leste SDP 2011-2030 proclaims that the country will become a medium income country 
until the year 2030. However current projects towards the implementation of that plan are not set 
up into a set of coherent projects. On one side the government wants to reduce the 
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unemployment and poverty in the country. On the other hand the national firms are hindered 
from the participation in the big infrastructure projects, and the possibility of their employment, 
capacity building and gaining experience is limited. Also, there is a lack of arena for national 
firms to be able to be involved into negotiations. It also hinders the government to communicate 
with the national firms and reveal the full potential of it. Thus the organizational field is weak 
and each actor seeks to maximize their own interest rather than achieving mutual goals and 
engaging more actively into negotiations. The institutional logic of key actors remains 
challenging as the institution itself (Lounsbury, 2008).    
 
5. 3.2 Key institutional actors  
The findings revealed that the key actors presented today in the infrastructure project of Tasi-
Mane are different in their power and maturity. The governments national petroleum company 
Timor Gap has been established in 2011 and is still young and lacks experience. The national 
firms are also immature compared to international competitors. The governmental institutions 
change rapidly in Timor-Leste and shape the current contractual regime as well. The situation 
described in the previous section refers to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Powell et al., (2005) 
as emerging organizational field.  Within this young and immature organizational field there is 
still a lack of interactions between the actors which in turn introduces challenges and barriers to 
all involved parties. However some developments have been revealed. For example Timor Gap 
serves as a “bridge” between the contractors, subcontractors and government. There is also lack 
of coordination and some conflict situations have been described. The next step according to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) would be an increase in the information load between the 
organizations in this field. National firms and international contractors have already shown the 
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interest to be able to get the transparent bidding process and better information about the 
projects. The last step, developing the mutual awareness, is not realized yet. As it was said before 
each actor is still acting in own interest and is not trying to involve others or introduce the mutual 
goals. The absence of the defined structure and roles in the field makes it difficult for the further 
development of it. 
In this study a premise or assumption is created that the actors can be featured as what 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell et al., (2005)  “emergence of fields” or what they call 
totality of relevant actors “connectedness and structural equivalence”, or this could be also 
partially explained as institutional arrangement/structure that formed in the institutional 
environment as play of the game (Williamson, 1985).The intended governance structure 
considered here is composed of government/state bureaucracies, business firms, nonprofit 
organizations, long-term contracts, commercial contracts and other related contractual 
structure/arrangements Williamson (1996). 
These protagonist groups around the Tasi-Mane project are consisting of Council of Ministers 
and CAFI, MPMR and Timor Gap, MPS, NDA, NPC, International Contractors, CCI-TL are the 
main dominant/authoritative group of actors that are connected and interested to Tasi-Mane 
project. As an outcome of their forces/pressure on national firms/industries participation and 
their interaction, creation of new decree law or rules for national firms as a process of 
institutional most probably discovered. Lounsbury (2008) institutional logic of the key 
protagonists offers a feasible way forward or solution to comprehend the motivation force for 
their actions and manners and also their influence or pressure towards national firms/industries. 
The main actors for the Tasi-Mane downstream petroleum infrastructures supporting project is 
central government, Timor Gap, and International Contractors with the following discussions: 
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The central government authorities (with the support from CAFI, MPS, NPC, NDA) influence 
other actors through legislation and ownership via MPMR as presented in the empirical parts. 
The change after the 2006 and 2007 political and military crisis or the period from (2008-2015) 
during Mr. Xanana Gusmão Prime Ministerial period this is the era of infrastructures 
development this can be characterized as a period of double digits economic growth or “stable 
state”. With the slogan “welcome development and good bye conflict”. 
Centralization of government, growing infrastructures development and providing infrastructures 
for national industries, growing control over strategic investment, and its ambitious 20 years 
Strategy Development Plan and development of Tasi-Mane project are now showing a new born 
of development for the bright future of the country. The first state national oil company Timor 
Gap has just established at the time they have provided with the role for just to manage and 
organize day to day management of Tasi-Mane project. Moreover, from this period of 
development there was no single state owned infrastructures companies established at that time, 
hence, most of Timor-Leste major infrastructures projects including Tasi-Mane clusters project 
have been awarded to international contractor/firms actors. Yet, it appears that in connection to 
Tasi-Mane project, both government through MPMR and Timor Gap are at this level 
encountering what we might express short-term quality and long-term capacity building 
dilemma. Do they able to engage national industries/firms involvement to secure the national 
interest of growth and will they able to secure Timor Gap interest for the same interest if the 
cluster projects continue implement by the international contractors. As my empirical findings 
shown from the very beginning, the challenges appear lack of legislation, incompletely 
developed policy that enhance national firms participation in big infrastructures project, and 
financial scheme from banking sectors, lack of enforcement, lack of mutual coordination of 
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building education and skills training dealing with use of technologies and equipment, and lack 
of interaction among them hence, this have raised possible conflict between central government 
and national firms and international contractors with national firms, and possible conflict 
between government and business associations and local firms in the Tasi-Mane clusters area. To 
overcome these challenges, it may requires to minimize the institutional environment constraints, 
by promoting inter-organizational network approach of Laumann et al. (1978) and institutional 
totality of relevant actors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1981). In consequence, opening the door for 
international companies and by not focusing developing the national competence in terms of 
experience and finance have not been enhancing the national firm’s to be part of the international 
projects. This may describe slow Tasi-Mane project clusters implementation and still very 
limited assistance or support to national firms /industry from the central government side. 
Timor Gap was mandated by the Timorese central government via MPMR to administer and 
manage the whole Tasi-Mane project and Timor gap assists and provide support the development 
of the knowledge and preparation of human resources in order to efficiently operate the 
petroleum sector and to support the creation of Tasi-Mane petroleum industry. As a new oil 
company, Timor Gap has prioritized needs of capacity development, foreign investments, 
knowledge/experience and technologies to develop Tasi-Mane petroleum industries. In this 
setting, Timor Gap gaining experiences as managing body, but the company has not provided 
with strong power to influence directly to Tasi-Mane petroleum industries and national 
infrastructures firms, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pointed that this might lack of strong 
forces that emerge to lead national industries to become more similar to other actors in the field. 
The control and power is still remaining with the central government through MPMR which is 
also as project owner wherein most of the Tasi-Mane petroleum industries still financed/funded 
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directly from the Government Infrastructure Fund supervised by the Administration Board of the 
Infrastructure Fund (CAFI). Yet, in practical work in the field MPMR and Timor Gap have 
greater opportunity in position on shaping and influencing the local or national contractor/firms 
participation as in this case both MPRM and Timor Gap together as Tasi-Mane project 
developer, as an result they exercises a high degree control over its partners international 
contractors. Timor Gap relationship with national firms in current Tasi-Mane project is very 
weak; the data that I collected shows that none of national firms/industries consulted and 
participate in the Tasi-Mane project development. National firms and its business association 
have been established and being presented in the region before Timor Gap was established and 
before the Tasi-Mane was designed, hence, they are in the networks in that field (environment), 
business association was recognized by the governments to be the partners of the development. 
This can be characterized as what (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell et al., 2005; and Morrill, 
2007) the emergence of fields forms as totality of relevant actors or this could be also partially 
explained as institutional arrangement/structure from the private firms that formed in the 
institutional environment as play of the game (Williamson, 1985). In his situation, MPRM can 
designs/develop the project which is involve as many of these national firms as possible in to the 
Tasi-Mane project, they could also receive support from MPMR or central government and 
Timor Gap, or they have to have same level of development of international infrastructures 
companies (whether through consortium or joint venture or through pre-qualifications filtering). 
Even International companies who win the international competitive bidding, according to the 
data that I collected, they cannot do the job by their own they need national firms. International 
bidding competitive which is involve the international companies with adopting very high 
international standards may lead the government/MPMR and Timor Gap to reduce their control 
63 
 
of infrastructures development in Tasi-Mane, for instance; government now cannot control the 
implementation of local participation clausal that impose to international contractors. 
The main International Contractors operate in Tasi-Mane such as PT Waskita Karya, Tbk, 
Hyundai Group and Covec due to their infrastructures development experience, financial power 
and technologies may be characterized as competent business partner. Yet, to some extent 
executing project in Timor-Leste, these companies has to follow Timorese rule of the game, 
establish by the project owner authorities, and NPC in terms of standards, specifications, local 
content, capacity building and contractual agreements. The work of International contractors if 
considering national firms (local participation) under such pressure can be characterized what 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; and Lounsbury 2008) call as institutionally rational, maybe with this 
direction of furnishing the Tasi-Mane area/regional development legitimizes firstly 
MPMR/Timor Gap and secondly international contractors in the eyes of Timor-Leste national 
firms or business associations, or in other way the work of International contractors and national 
firms/industry can be partially be characterized as increasing in interaction among organizational 
in the field that (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; and Scott et al., 2000) defined organizational group 
that involve in similar activities and are fundamental to common pressures regulatory and 
reputational. This kind of competence development can guarantee the maintenance of the project 
when all international contractor left.  
In this discussion, assumption was made that the key actors can be characterized as emerging 
fields as institutional totality of relevant actors or partially characterized as institutional 
arrangement or governance structures. Therefore, to answer this research question (about 
development/political/ forces changing contractual regime with focus on Tasi-Mane project), this 
study shows that in the purpose of historical development/political changes, an institutional 
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arrangement/governance structure was established according to SDP and development of 
infrastructures needs, where government bureaucracy, and business firms administer relationship 
providing contract to other actors to make Tasi-Mane project happen. The central government 
through its MPMR and Timor Gap intend to decentralize their activities and tailored the ICB 
design building to international market by involving international contractors’ actors and give 
very little opportunities to national firms, which is a sign of governance structure/institutional 
arrangement that transaction cost might high (Williamson, 1996). Partly can be explained by lack 
of capacity from the national construction firms and government try to offer and have control on 
international actors with the objective to get jobs done faster from international contractors in 
which value of money (quality project) considerable as the reason. 
 
To sum up, the situation in which national firms with its business associations and organizations 
found at the time this study conducted they felt it very difficult to participate in the projects. 
Several changes has occurred in contractual regimes since 2005, the changes are all about 
defining authorities competence procedures and the formation of national institutions to oversee 
the infrastructures funded project and other public projects. The contractual regime has not 
committed emphasize rigorously on how the national industries part of the international projects. 
The very high Tasi-Mane project requirements in the bidding document have not giving room for 
national firms to be part of the Tasi-Mane project from the very beginning of bidding process. 
The findings were that the Tasi-Mane project has been slow due to the lack of national people 
skills to make it happened both from private and government sides.  It is not negligible that 
government in fact has offered so many projects bellow 500,000 USD to national industries 
previously but the capacity has not built as expected. At the same conditions, very little support  
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Table 4 Summary of key actors, their roles, interaction, and implications for national firms 
Characteristics  
Actors Key roles Interaction/reciprocation/interp
lay with others 
Implication for National 
Firms 
Ministry of 
Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources 
(MPMR)  
Project owner as a representative 
from CoM, responsible for all 
decision making process and 
facilitating the decision making 
in CoM after hearing from MPC 
and NPC recommendations. 
Project development actor 
(designer), inter-ministerial 
cooperation and community 
engagement in the project, as 
regulative authorities.  
There is national 
institution for the 
support of private 
sectors (IADE), 
preparing decree law for 
ensuring national firms 
participation 
Ministry of Public 
Works, 
Transportation and 
Communication 
(MPWTC) 
Responsible for pre-
qualifications process of national 
firms and maintenance roles after 
all Tasi-Mane project done  
Filtering national firms and 
selection of contractor 
generally, and specifically in 
highway and airport 
development. 
Provide small scale 
infrastructures project 
for ground learning and 
have regular meeting 
with construction 
contractors  
ADN Monitoring of physical 
construction quality control body 
and reviewing the merit and 
feasibility of capital development 
project 
Supervising, verifying and 
certifying capital development 
projects, as well as their 
execution, in coordination with 
the relevant ministry; 
No program to support 
national firms and very 
negative towards  
national firms 
Procurement 
authorities; NPC 
Procurement entity, responsible 
for procurement service to public 
entities, in this case to MPMR 
and Timor Gap E.P, Positive to 
develop national firm’s capacity. 
Possible tensions with national 
construction companies 
A relation between project 
owner,  Selection of bidding 
document, selection of 
contractors based on ICB 
Ensuring the local 
participation from the 
contract. Offering 
training on bidding 
document, project 
management for national 
firms 
Timor Gap, EP 
(national oil 
company) 
Mandated by the government to 
manage and organize day to day 
activities of Tasi-Mane cluster 
project.  
Management and knowledge 
gaining interest since it’s a 
new born oil company, and 
commercial interest. 
relationship with government 
authorities and international 
contractors 
Not trust to local 
companies and no 
program to support to 
national firms 
International 
Companies 
Multinational contractors with 
high technologies  developing the 
supply base, airport, highway, 
refinery, petrochemical 
infrastructures 
Project executor or main 
contractor,  relationship with 
national contractors and 
project owner 
Support national sub-
contractors, and engage 
national contractors to 
learn from them 
Chamber Commerce 
and Industries of 
Timor-Leste 
Public organization representing 
business association and 
recognized by the government as 
strategic partner for national 
development. 
Its members are the possible sub-
contractors 
 
Has been a government 
partner, play a role as a bridge 
between businesses (CNT, 
small and medium-sized) with 
government as well as with 
other key actors 
Train national firms, 
linking members voice 
to government, develop 
strategic plan and 
implementing 
productive sector 
programs in the Tasi-
Mane project area, for 
instance; hotel, 
restaurant, agriculture 
etc. 
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from the national government was provided to business associations and individual national 
firms. And state institutions were established to be responsible building competence of national 
firms and people for instance; SEPFOPE, IADE and Universities have not been maximize in 
linking with the development of Tasi-Mane projects, national firms had not been experienced in 
building airport, highway and supply base, refinery etc. However, such conditions were 
commented by the international contractors that local people and firms are lack of capacity and 
that difficult to involve them. But some international firms who already operate in the Tasi-Mane 
project try to bring ideas experience from the constructions. Involvement of Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries of Timor-Leste (CCI-TL) in the Tasi-Mane projects it remains silent, 
but they were established and do play a crucial roles and jobs in the existence of national 
firms/industries. 
CCI-TL mandated by its members and endorsed by the government itself to play a role of linking 
and negotiators on behalf of the businesses and assist them to provide information about market 
and opportunities. The interest of the Timorese government and international contractors are 
facilitated by MPMR through Timor Gap E.P with NPC, which is by turns connected to other, 
national level contractors. The implications for national firms and interplay between the key 
actors are summarized in ( 
Table 4 Summary of key actors, their roles, interaction, and implications for national firms). 
5.3.3 National firms’ inclusion and exclusion in the formation of contractual regimes  
To answer this question, it has been partially explained already in the analysis of political 
developments and from the question of the key forces hindering the contractual regime. The 
implementation of infrastructures projects and strategy development plan (SDP) may force the 
national firms to be established and be part of the strategy vice-versa national firms could be 
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ignored because government wants the SDP and Tasi-Mane project to be implemented. As 
presented in DiMaggio and Powel (1983) macro institutional pillars may be partially explained 
by the regulative pressure on organizational in the field (top down pressure) and coercive 
isomorphic pressure. For instance; high regulations in the bidding process, strict evaluations and 
procurement decree laws from government state actors that only in favor to competent 
international contractors and expectations of high quality work may prevent the national firm 
participation in Tasi-Mane project, moreover, there were several regulative pressures based on 
government evaluation from the previous experiences that they have carried out to national 
firms, the perspectives was that national firms were practicing inappropriateness of behavior, 
spending money on unproductive activities, and being consistently dependent on government 
projects, hence, this might prevent their ability to be part of the Tasi-Mane project.  
On the other side, according to Scott (2008b) and Lounsbury (2008) broader regulative force can 
shape organizational behavior in order to be more embedding or grow themselves, for instance, 
the local participation clausal contract defined by the central government and Timor Gap 
especially for the Suai Airport, Highway and Suai Supply Base cluster project in Tasi - Mane 
even though the term was not so clear but it was providing opportunities for national firms to be 
part of the project, they have been offered a chance to get sub-contracting of activities as a result 
of the regulative shaping/pressure. Nevertheless, it was a little bit difficult for international 
contractors to implement that local participation clausal according to the data that I collected, 
national firms do not possess the requirements imposed by the government and international 
contractors. The local participation clausal is mandated from the government or derives from the 
procurement law; this can be characterized partially/to limited extend with DiMaggio and Powel 
(1983) regulative or coercive pressure (pressures from other organizations in which they are 
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dependent upon) and it can be fits with Laumann et al., (1978) connectedness that national and 
international contactors are tight with relational contracts. This pressure have a positive intention 
that when national firms get those chances they might learn from the international firms, because 
the more dependent on another organization, the more alike it will become.      
Hence, as claimed by DiMaggio and Powel’s (1983) relationship networks structured, field is an 
economic and social activity accepted area where among surrounding actors develops mutual 
relationships. In this case, the actors are international contractors, national firms and business 
associations as well as state bureaucracy including Timor gap. These actors may stand in the 
structure of relations as pointed by (Scott, 1991; DiMaggio, 1991) social or economic actors and 
other organizations not merely be participate in exchange relationship but they are postured in a 
network or in structural linkages that shape (put together their action in particular form) their 
actions and determine the limits of their possibilities. In relation to this, institutional field have 
played a role providing more detail explanation and possible solutions on how national firms can 
involve in the Tasi-Mane project. According to empirical data that I gathered, both national and 
local companies in the project areas have not been able to take part of the project because one 
another reasons, for instance; needs interaction among organizations in the field and a cultural 
habit of waiting someone to provide them project. The issue of interaction should be maximized 
among national firms, international contractors and government through the existing forum that 
has been created most especially national firms should more proactive in changing their behavior 
toward others. This can be explained that the relationship between the fields evolving structure 
and network dynamic needs to be established to create forward movement in describing 
organizations or actor’s behavior of “one kind or another influence the actions of organizations 
of another kind” (Powell et al., 2005). The concept of this field can make interaction occurs and 
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influence on the decision of actors involved (DiMaggio, 1983), for instance, national firms and 
its business association should enhance/strengthening their linkages and show their positive 
behavior to influence government decisions. The institutional field could also as an arena for 
dialogue and discussions (Hoffman, 1999), key actors in Tasi-Mane arena such as; Timorese 
business associations, international contractors, government and Timor Gap may debate or 
negotiate a collective coalitions for common interest and field can organize as a center for 
interactions and information exchange (DiMaggio, 1983). By increasing interactions may allow 
participation of national firms in Tasi-Mane project. 
Another way of involving in the Tasi-Mane project, national firms may change their behavior in 
terms of what other do and success in the field level. DiMaggio and Powel’s (1983) normative 
isomorphic for example; when norms introduced during education are entered into organizations 
then they gain legitimacy from others. National firms may lend money from bank, may consider 
management as an important aspect, and they may hire professional skills entering their 
constructions work. This will improve their chance to be in the game, because the greater the 
reliance in using academic credentials to choose staff, the greater will be similar to other 
organizations (1983). Also the greater the participation of members in professional 
organizations, to more alike the organizations will be. 
  
5.3.4 Key forces stimulating /hindering for formation of the contractual regime 
In generally I claim that institutional drivers/forces for the formation of the contractual regime in 
Tasi-Mane projects are associated with the government infrastructures development - SDP that 
requiring development of Tasi-Mane move forward, regulative pressures, the interaction of 
different actor’s shaping the organizational field. If the national contractors companies demand 
or desires to participate the Tasi-Mane project, they have to respond or behave towards these 
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institutional pressures with the following conditions; either in terms of proactive 
reaction/behavior to change it (try to improve performance, not being a lazy neighbors) or in 
terms of adjustment to the existing governance regime (catching-up) or process opportunities for 
change. The institutional arrangement (governance structure) can provide 
stimulations/motivation the possible national argument firms to separate/ disengage the practices 
(where they are from) to actively learn to imitate the other international contractors who operates 
in the same field. The conclusions that can be drawn (implications) from these three arguments 
are endorsed by the following justifications. 
Firstly, the high pressure of the government infrastructures development - SDP that requiring 
development of Tasi-Mane move forward may be a reason for (North, 1991) political institutions 
to maximizing productivity in the setting of institutional environments, or this maybe a basis or a 
reason for (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; Scott 2001, 2008b; and Morrill, 2007) emerging field of 
totality relevant actor. Pointed that to participate in Tasi-Mane project powerful/strong forces 
may emerge to direct them to become more alike or identic to other actors. National 
firm/industries in short-term may improve their objective/vision or develop promising practices 
for change. However, for the long-term purpose, organizational actors developing logics by 
creating rational decisions build around themselves an environment that impede their capability 
to improve further in later years (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Under the situation of 
infrastructure development and SDP implementation pressures, newly established national 
construction companies may begin to start learn to imitate one another’s practices and 
experiences specially imitating from the international firms with mindful that this might efficient 
and rational to be part of the game in Tasi-Mane project. Those who are succeeds most are those 
companies often imitated. Similarly, Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl (1996); and 
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Thornton (2002) suggested that enough resources and legitimacy to survive must be developed 
by new organizations and creating resonance between the logics or rational action of existing 
institutions, therefore, existing institutions could play a significant role in legitimating 
organizations in emerging field.  
In specific case of emerging field, bringing solution to overcome the dispute that occur is 
actually not easy since “the greater the range and intensity of schisms, the more difficult will be 
the task of developing acceptable norms” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 75–76). However, to 
establish acceptance of new institutional governance structure/arrangement, national firms may 
cultivate avenue for change, deploy assistance from institutionalized actors, searching to suits 
into strong system (Beckert, 1999). Moreover, Reay et al., (2006) offer that national firms may 
endeavor demonstrate the new forms value. 
 
Secondly, as pointed by Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) organizational ceremony and myths that 
high institutional force might pressure organizations to advance their formal structures and 
promote myths may partially explain that the institutional rules function gaining legitimacy, 
stability, resources, and organizations incorporate. That the more institutional rules and 
rationalized structure in given area/ domains will require network of local relation insist structure 
development to control and coordinate activities hence this type of structure will removed less 
efficient organizations where the organizational leaders and authority produce a very high 
institutionalized context. At the same time, Meyer and Rowan also presented that the pressure of 
high institutional regulative could influence/force the organization to create formal structures to 
encourage behavior of ceremonial in order to decrease control, formal review and evaluation of 
operational activities. The outcome of this could make the organizations legitimization 
applications demand to de-couple by those that have objective to maximize efficiency. National 
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firms that associated with Tasi-Mane project for example might be exposed or unprotected to 
that type of process or development due to high regulative force/pressure from Timor-Leste 
central government (for instance; laws and regulation that allowing for international competitive 
biddings where high requirement in bidding documents such as; financial guarantee, experiences, 
and equipment).  
 
Thirdly, the interaction of different actor’s shaping the organizational field, as claimed by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) an institutional field is a perceived domain of economic or social 
activity where among the actors they build relations, shape or put together their representation of 
actions and structure of social. Hence, in this driver, organizations that gather within one 
organizational field might become identical or homogenous as an outcome of development or 
change (1983). The state process of organization in a structured field or isomorphic 
development/change may be partially or to limited extend explained that by the fact is that 
organizations are fraction or the same environment. Yet, in the latest study underline on process 
to directing field DE-structuration (Lounsbury, 2008). This situation occurs when among actors 
provide pressure the organizational field. The actor’s interaction was discussed in this research. 
In the opinion of the data that I collected, Timor-Leste national firms/industries pushed to relate 
themselves to various actors as a result turned to be similar in form and relations (isomorphic) 
with the other actors. So, national firms/industries should have to make an alternative because in 
the field level some actors are quite challenging. For instance, some national companies have 
courage that they will get sub-contracting from Indonesia and China’s Companies in the ongoing 
Tasi-Mane project such as: Suai airport, Suai Supply Base and highway development where 
some government officials also stressed this during my interviewing. Some national companies 
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also believe that with the help from CCI-TL they will get contract from the government in the 
future. Other national companies may try to learn from their experience and from international 
contractors by improving their management also their financial capabilities.  
 
5.3.5 Contractual regime balancing short-term quality versus long-term capacity building 
This research question concerns about the infrastructures development in Tasi-Mane petroleum 
infrastructures and how its contractual regime can balance the Timorese capacity building to 
execute the development of infrastructures itself. As my empirical findings show the national 
industries’ presence in Tasi-Mane project is almost absent and is certainly fewer than expected, 
because the lack of capacity to meet the requirements and to compete in international 
competitive biddings of the Tasi-Mane cluster project. To discuss this phenomenon, the 
combination of new institutional economy, sociology and agency theory are proposed to explain 
this question. The answer of this question has been partially provided from institutional’ 
organizational field, and interactions among actors in organizational field in previous research 
questions, however, the macro pillar of institutional theories can be extended in this part of 
discussion to explain how policy making from NIE perspective can shape and explain human 
development in terms of education and  training for building competencies in the area of Tasi-
Mane petroleum infrastructures development and how Williamson institutional arrangement 
approach explains this question. 
 
NIE and competence building 
First of all, government of Timor-Leste is willing to include the national firms into the Tasi-
Mane clusters project and thus help in wealth creation and reducing unemployment, as well as 
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knowledge and capacity building of national firms (Government of Timor-Leste 2011). This is 
then as motivations for government to establish different of nationals institutions for carrying out 
the projects, and at the same time to encourage/stimulating national business to be established 
and performed as government partners in the implementation of the Tasi-Mane projects. 
However it has not been an easy way as the analysis chapter has shown. As presented by 
Williamson’s (1998) formal and informal institutional arrangement5 that to reach economic 
development the appearance of private sector institutions is a powerful determinant. This might 
interpreted that the Timor-Leste government is in authority to shape the national firms’ chance to 
participate in the Tasi-Mane international project. As it emphasized that the successful of the 
state institutions are realized when they embedded in private firms constraints (p.1). According 
to empirical data that I collected, there emerge challenging situations as whether to build the 
Tasi-Mane cluster project or build the competence first according to western style of doing 
projects. However, this is a challenging for a small and poor country to develop its economy. 
The institutional arrangement gaps are presented.  This is strongly correlated to a statement made 
by a government Minister that; 
 “It’s all about tradeoffs, and that you have to decide it sometimes and go ahead with that. 
That’s all to be in like that. I can go, like trade-offs human resources, you do it now, do it latter, 
do it dream, we took of do it now. Then issues like institutional arrangements, why it’s a best 
way to institutionalize yourself to have probably checked and balances, you wait for the human 
resources, or you set up the institution now, what you have and do that. So we decided we set up 
now and we go. So, trade-in and trade-off” 
 
Hence, the development of Tasi-Mane petroleum industries can be implemented where trainings 
and universities role maximizes to shape the institutional environment too. At the same time, 
government, international and national firms, collaborate hand in hand by using the principle of 
learning by doing. This has been explained previously in the institutional field interactions 
                                                           
5
 Williamson, C. R. (1998) defined institutions represent government defined and enforced constraints while 
informal institutions capture private constraints. 
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(DiMaggio and Powel, 1983) that national firms can follow what others have made and achieve 
success. This argument also supported by a respondent that the capacity building is built from the 
project itself that is why government gave all the Tasi-Mane cluster project in the international 
competitive bidding because it will develop the national firms capacity automatically. The efforts 
that Timorese government has made might fits with North’s (1993) Institutional arrangements 
that supports the idea that government, and private institutional actors are complementary and 
permit allow for another round of private business practices to develop (North 1990). Moreover, 
this can be explained in general by the new institutional economics, for example from 
Williamson’s (1998) approach that institutions in one part are a play of the game in an 
institutional environment. They are social arrangements that may encourage or push economic 
growth (Libecap, 1997). The Tasi-Mane goals can be only achieved from new institutional 
economics (NIE) point of view that if all the actors concerned about on how economic, political, 
legal and social institutions influence their performance (Platteau, 1994a, b).  
However, one of the key drivers of this phenomenon is high (political and economic) transaction 
costs. Yet, there is an alternative for a new institutional arrangement that may balance this 
dilemma that political institutions could perform a better policy. In empirical data that I 
collected, the pillars of institutions shape the development of Tasi-Mane project are presented as 
weak ties and lack of coordination to maximize the efforts when they develop mega projects.  
This might what North (1990) pointed as an institutional constraints where an organization does 
not have or is not able to utilize all the resources that it might want to use. For example, there 
were many institutions have been established in Timor-Leste before Tasi-Mane developed that 
they are supposed to shape for the successful development of Tasi-Mane project, for instance; 
Institute for Development Support for Medium and Small Enterprise (IADE), Secretary of State 
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for Employment Policy and Vocational Training (SEPFOPE), universities and college, chamber 
of commerce and industries and many other relevant organizations have not been maximized to 
contribute to the development of the Tasi-Mane project, nor have they been coordinated properly 
into the framework of institutions. The central government, MPMR and Timor Gap does things 
on their own in the design and development of the project concept, moreover, the government 
monitoring procurement bodies does not consider those potential actors into framework to 
prepare skills, knowledge, and business competence in building Tasi-Mane infrastructures. This 
could suggest that these weak institutional ties should change or make to a new institutional 
arrangement. North (1990) emphasis the institutional framework performs a vital role in the 
performance of an economy; according to North it decreases the human interactions uncertainty 
and thus the cooperation’s cost. Changing the knowledge or ideology and change in total 
population will enable those protagonist or main actors to perceive that they might be better off 
under result in institutional change, and alternative institutional arrangement. Nevertheless, 
change of institutional is characterized as path dependent and molded by the reaction between 
political markets and economic (North, 1981). In regard to the towering (economic and political) 
transaction costs, ineffective or inefficient institutions could continue firmly or persist for 
extensive time period (North, 1990). However, state as a ruler who maximizes its 
efficiency/profit targeted to two institutional constraints; transaction cost and level of political 
competition with competitors and other States. For these arguments, the property rights structure, 
which maximizes the social product, may not maximize the ruler’s (long-term) monopoly rents. 
Thus, in order to stabilize his power, ‘the ruler will agree to a property rights structure that is 
favorable to those groups with close access to alternative rulers, regardless of its effects upon 
efficiency’ North (1981: 28). 
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With the above findings and discussion, high transactions could be avoided by changing the 
current government of Timor-Leste project development and contracting process by introducing 
a new institutional arrangement where to include Timorese potential actors for collective action. 
To support this, Williamson (1985) argues that institutional arrangement or governance structure 
could change depends on the transaction characteristics, moreover, North (1990) defined 
between the institutional environment and institutional arrangement that ‘the former being a 
subset of the latter, which is a set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that 
govern economic and political activity’ (Davis and North, 1970: 133).  
In this regard, I claimed to complement the current Timor-Leste government project 
development, procurement/contracting and monitoring process regime (see World Bank and 
MoF, 2015, p. 129) by proposing a new governance structure/ institutional arrangement “project 
development, competences and contracting process” within the Timor-Leste infrastructures fund 
which also fund the Tasi-Mane petroleum infrastructures projects. I believe that it considerably 
to involve greater actors in collective actions as the response to weak institutional ties; weak 
coordination and long-term competence building and monitoring simultaneously (Figure 6 
Proposed Project Developments, Competence and Contracting Process (based on the report 
World Bank and MoF, p. 129).  
An improved project development and procurement process purposed to complement 
government contracting process (see 2015 World Bank and Ministry of Finance report) described 
in (Figure 6 Proposed Project Developments, Competence and Contracting Process (based on 
the report World Bank and MoF, p. 129) below. This figure of Proposed Project Development, 
Competence and Contracting Process is developed to give some of the solution from barriers and 
not to only provide solution for the complexity of long procurement process but it includes the 
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integration of education/building competence, and proper monitoring/quality control in one 
system. This means that when government develop a mega project or project value exceeds one 
million USD within the Infrastructure fund it have already involve an integration approach which 
involves potential actors where in the first stage of the figure is that government and those actors 
prepare human resource both in higher school and private sector capacity building sector first, so 
that when the project is developed they already have people available to work with both national 
and international constructions companies. For the second stage of the figure is that in the project  
designs and development phases for instance; Tasi-Mane project,  the whole government related 
Ministries and competence building institutions/organizations that associated to the state 
infrastructure development is already included from the very beginning of the 
procurement/contracting process and supervision process. This then, government as political 
actors can shape this environment with law enforcement to govern this economic activity.  
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Figure 6 Proposed Project Developments, Competence and Contracting Process (based on the 
report World Bank and MoF, p. 129) 
Secondly, as it not been easy way, one can argue whether the government has provided a 
sufficient institutional environment to operate in for the actors. There are indeed laws and 
regulations that define the behavior and performance based on existing or stipulated legal laws in 
the area. Social norms are however somewhat different from the government ambitions. As it is 
known now the national firms could have subcontracted the project for the 90 per cent of its cost 
and leave the tender with the remaining 10 per cent. This misuse of the contractual arrangement 
has not been adequately thought about beforehand and it can be thought that more “common 
rules” have been playing instead of legal laws at this time. In relation to this can also contribute 
to the lack of trust from the government and international contractors over national firms this can 
be characterized in the setting of organizational behavior (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989, 1988; Kosnik, 
1987) interesting that organizations that supposed to be a potential representatives for other 
organization could have attempted to behave in order to be successful and have legitimacy in 
certain environments. It was observed that national firms have not built their reputations, the 
legitimacy and trust previously therefore one of the underline issues that national firms did not 
get the Tasi-Mane project was the problem of work morale is true. Therefore, national firms are 
positioned in the same environment that they have provided to interact with both government and 
international contractors and to practice good behaviors to be successful. To conclude this 
institutional environment and that it needs to be developed more to be a real formatter and a rule 
maker for the actors. That the laws in their today statement hinder national firms from 
tender/bidding process and do not involve them in further steps too. There is a mismatch between 
what government says and promises and what it really does on paper “for real”. 
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Institutional arrangements and holdup problem 
Williamson’s (1985) approach on governance structure/institutional arrangement illustrated by 
its attentions on incompletes contracts. One of the reasons why Timorese firms/industries cannot 
win the Tasi-Mane international project might described by the framework of transaction cost, 
organization of economic enforces/ imposes costs because sophisticated contracts are normally 
incomplete (Williamson, 1985). Both in government bidding process and the international 
companies that have been operated in the Tasi-Mane project have difficulties involving national 
firms or sub-contracting some of its work, is actually proven that it is expensive to do such 
arrangement of governance because what government sees in bidding process and what 
international firms faced is that the institutional environment’s situation to support national firms 
to have chances to win the project or as sub-contracting beneficiary has some limitations, for 
example lack of capacity in the field level, hence, government or international contractors may 
not to cover investments in capacity building for providing education and training whomever its 
partner is when the project owner seek for the high quality of specifications and that the main 
contractor seek for efficiency. Because contractual incompleteness may exposes the contracting 
parties to some sort of risks. This situation is actually happened in the Tasi-Mane clusters project 
where international contract cannot here locals with risks; hence, the administering agreement 
may no longer be effective. This can be lead to Williamson (1989) transaction cost economic 
framework that a costs major source that a firm must attempt to reduce so that increases 
efficiency of economic or in other word that if the friction between to make and to buy is higher 
than through and interval hierarchical system the international firms should internalize. To 
internalize, that is, integrate vertically, to reduce transaction cost. This is phenomenon is more 
relevant to what Williamson (1991a) call as “hold up” problem or maladaptation cost, this is the 
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best-known example of a contractual hazards. Therefore, transaction cost economics eases this 
premise that several complex contract are unpreventable incomplete. For instance; installation of 
airport, supply base, specialized and other sophisticated contract in Tasi-Mane petroleum 
infrastructures project is needing complex contract, thus this kind of contract will characterized 
be incomplete that might need some repairmen of agreement with some potential contingencies 
in future. For example Tasi-Mane contract relations in which a government and international 
contractors agreed upon on shared goals on maintenance of the specialized equipment and 
projects that each of them are going to responsible for.  
This problem is consistence with explanations of Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Globeman 
(1980) after they test contractual interpretation of vertical integration that the effects of the 
specificity of assets, stipulated as worker-specific knowledge or “application of engineering 
efforts” they found that technical knowledge and use engineering efforts are the main backwards 
integration. This is also explained by one of the government procurement officers that such Suai 
Supply Base cluster project in Tasi-Mane is highly required technology, knowledge and 
experience. When the main international contractors started internalize the entire Tasi-Mane 
clusters project that is the turning point national firms were limited to be part of the game. I 
found that there was anger from national firms when they were excluded from the project with 
the high requirements from international competitive biddings, in relates to this DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) isomorphic coercive pressure can partially be explained that where national firms 
are forced to change by external forces. The pressures with the meaning that national firms meet 
high requirements of international bidding criteria that are actually not reflecting to their own 
conditions. To sum up, in modest explanation, transaction cost economics attempts to describe 
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how trading partners opt, from the alternatives visibility institutional, the arrangement that 
safeguards their relations-specific investment at the least cost. 
Chapter 6.0 Conclusion and future research 
6.1 Conclusion 
The research problem of this study is “what institutional forces have been forming the 
current contractual regime?” Therefore, the aim of this study is to illustrate and analyze the 
development of Timor-Leste contracting regimes, paying attention to Timor Gap’s Tasi-Mane 
project and national firms/industry involvement. To do so, the study tries to solve the following 
specific research questions:  What institutional actors have participated in the formation of 
current regime for Tasi-Mane project and how? How was the local industry/national firms 
included and excluded in this formation of current contractual regime? What forces has been 
stimulating /hindering for formation of the contractual regime? And how does government 
contractual regime balance short term quality versus long term capacity building? 
 
This study illustrates the development of Timor-Leste contractual regime during the past 13 
years and how it has shaped the participation of national firms in the development of 
infrastructure projects, particularly Tasi-Mane petroleum infrastructure project. It also offers 
insights into the interactions between the main actors in the emerging organizational field in 
Tasi-Mane petroleum infrastructure project arena as a result of changing contractual regime and 
political development.  
The contractual regime and political changes presented that key government (political) and 
businesses influential actors that shape the Tasi-Mane infrastructure project are in the process of 
establishing and capacity building stage. Empirical data has shown that Timorese political and 
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business actors are new and lack experience, capacity and education; they are exposed to lack or 
enforcement/lack of regulation, lack of interaction/coordination, and lack of trust to one another 
and sometimes conflicts.  
Therefore the organizational field remains weak and lacks connectedness and understanding of 
mutual goals. In addition, institutional arrangements are also weak and not sophisticated. In 
emerging economies from the place where international contractors coming from, the emergence 
institutional fields and institutional arrangements at political and business levels usually 
represents the mixture/ combination or mix-forms of similar versions. However, in terms of 
relationships, coordination, interest and control, the conditions in Timor-Leste are in fact very 
different compared with more advanced countries. The establishment of relationships between 
the key actors in Timor-Leste is still very challenging where public policies are still not favoring 
better coordination, this is still and ongoing learning process highlighting several issues that has 
not been solved. Structured network of relationship/interactions, lack of coordination or weak 
institutional arrangement may not be suitable for international contractors to build business 
networks of market-driven approach. Moreover, creation of similar values and practices as well 
as institutions, seeking for an appropriate equilibrium between various coordination and 
networking relationships in terms of behavior and actions, building of common practices by 
Timor-Leste and international contractors, all represent great importance and pivotal 
determinants for successful in execution of the projects. This also represents a country that has 
been struggling with economics development. 
DiMaggio and Powel (1983) institutional pillars (regulative), institutional mechanisms and 
institutional field (increasing interactions among organizational in the field) where considered in 
combinations to explain the degree of participation of national firms in current formation of 
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contractual regime. In Timor-Leste, in the case of Tasi-Mane project, local industry/national 
firms were both included and excluded in the formation of current contractual regime, originated 
from (1) its infrastructure development and country strategic plan pushes them to participate but 
at the same time stating the high requirements is a barrier (2) local content clausal contract (3) 
increasing interactions and information exchange (4) improving behavior, practices and 
proactive learning. 
The study argues that the regulative and procurement laws pressures (Scott, 2008b; and 
Lounsbury, 2008) will motivate and change national firms earlier work morale and better 
embeddedness can enable them to grow by themselves, push themselves to fulfill the 
requirements set up by the government in terms of capital and experiences and be able to be part 
of the sub-contracting partner where applicable. This could be achieved if national firms 
increased their interactions with government and international contractors. DiMaggio and 
Powel’s (1983) normative isomorphic system constitutes that national firms can follow what 
international organizations have achieved and reach favorable outcome in their work.  
In this study, the combinations of macro and micro level of institutional theory have been 
utilized in order to observe how institutional forces shape the government contractual regime and 
how these forces are connected with organizational change. The forces that have been hindering 
the current formation of contractual regime in the case of Tasi-Mane petroleum infrastructure 
supporting project originated from the government infrastructures program- implementation of 
strategy development (SDP) that requires rapid development of Tasi-Mane, secondly, regulative 
pressures, and thirdly, the interactions of different actors shaping the organizational field. The 
study advises that these forces could make the difference in the organizational fields and 
encouragement or push for national companies to disengage or separate their actions and 
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behavior or just passively mimic or imitate the others, or national firms have to be responsive 
towards the institutional pressures by proactively changing their behavior and performance and 
promote better facilitating/ interaction of better cooperation. 
Finally, this study has also briefly analyzed the dilemma situation that Timor-Leste government 
have faced in the development of Tasi-Mane infrastructure, where they seem to have a short-
term focus on quality rather than long-term capacity building. However, the NIE institutional 
arrangements partially help in explaining this phenomenon, to balance this dilemma, government 
should be shaping the institutional environments and at the same time utilizing all its 
organizations both public and private to complement each other and making it together and learn 
together. Developing favorable public policy where all actors and resources are maximized to be 
functioning, and minimizing what North (1990) pointed as institutional constraints. Government 
is also required to propose an alternative of current institutional arrangements to avoid high 
(political and economic) transaction costs, through integrated competences that secure long term 
capacity building.   
 
6.2 Limitations 
One potential issue of this study is that the respondents have not been able to look over the 
transcribed interviews and comment on their own words. This can be partly explained due to the 
interviews have been performed in different languages, but later transcribed and translated into 
the English language. Due to the limited time for the writing of this thesis, this step has been 
solved by inviting two additional researchers to control some of the transcriptions.  
It presents that the study is quite comprehensive nature, utilizing analysis from new institutional 
economics, sociology and agency theory – new institutional in terms of both institutional macro 
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and micro level analysis, government (political) and business actors, changes in economic 
development, organizations and institutional in a setting or contextual relationship, may be 
considered or take into account as reasons for its possible limitations.  Nevertheless, my central 
idea of focus was to offer a comprehensive view of the circumstances, conditions and indicating 
or showing major important array or provide directions for future research.  
The study has been conducted in Timor-Leste which is a new country and has a short history of 
contractual arrangements. Thus the findings cannot be easily translated to other contexts. 
However this was not the intention of this thesis.  
6.3. Newly discovered knowledge gap advices 
The development of Timor-Leste contractual regime focusing on Tasi-Mane infrastructure 
project found dilemma situations; however, most of the government infrastructures were built 
from early 2008 and from that time have remained the same. Therefore, this study suggests 
different ways of solving these challenges that might shape this phenomenon in order to give 
greater opportunities for national firms/industries and at the same building national competences 
to deliver better quality services as follows: firstly, for the central government, especially 
MPMR and MPWTC may establish state owned infrastructure and consultant companies. This 
may build national competences in which one day these state companies may become 
responsible for the maintenances and they may build the same projects in other countries. 
Developing infrastructures is good for economy growth (Calderón & Servén, 2004; Cockburn et 
al., 2013), but it will only be meaningful when more Timorese get involved and maximum goods 
and services are acquired locally. Therefore, building national competence is very crucial to 
balance this dilemma, in addition, Timor-Leste government has a role develop an appropriate 
procurement law that protect national firms/industries interests (e.g., Perng and Chan, 2004) and 
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government are in authority to shape all the relevant actors with proper policy and to make sure 
that there is an interactions channeled to all relevant actors, to maximize their ability to 
contribute to building of competences as well as stablishing state guarantee fond or making sure 
that banking system provide credits for local companies. Capital market establishment should be 
prioritized; moreover the law and legislation for these issues must be renewed and introduced, so 
that it can bridge the trust between banks and constructions companies. Secondly, international 
contractors should provide knowledge and skills in building and consider the local participation 
seriously, hiring skilled local people and sub-contract projects to national firms who have passed 
the pre-qualification screening from the government. By doing this, Timorese people and 
national firms can learn from them. Thirdly, for the Chamber of Commerce, and national 
companies, they may strengthen training, experience exchange, linking with vocational trainings 
and enhance interactions with both government and international contractors. Change in their 
behavior is waited by government in order to provide the national firms with projects but they 
may also invest in productive sectors. Learning from others who have already success as well as 
building a good reputation and legitimacy. This may create trust from others especially to get 
access credit from banks and government as well as international firms. Fourthly, for 
universities and college, the universities should design courses which contribute to the booming 
infrastructures development. For example, courses that need to contribute to development of the 
Tasi-Mane clusters project: engineering, creation of MBA at National University of Timor-Leste 
(UNTL) where people from private sectors and various discipline come to study project 
management and business administrations. In addition, research and development (R&D) should 
be established in order to discover new knowledge, creating innovations and improving services 
and products. This R&D can be the basis for government ministries including its agencies (MPS, 
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NDA, and NPC) and Timor Gap to design the Tasi-Mane and infrastructures development, 
procurement and contracts and monitoring. Lastly, the World Bank, ADB and other international 
donor partners’ which play an important role today should provide capacity building which is 
incorporated in infrastructures development. Advices for government include contracting and 
procurement regime flexible enough tailored to national context and cultures, international 
convergence and standards are good but it may not fit to other countries like Timor-Leste, as the 
result of ICB process, none of Timorese companies participate in the Tasi-Mane infrastructures 
project. In addition, international agencies may provide advices, but government of Timor-Leste 
is in authority to decide on everything, and is not always following the advices, the 
infrastructures project and SDP implementation should take into account this dilemma by 
considering the following questions: (1) should we build fast through inviting the international 
firms with their equipment and competences and not prioritize learning of locals in order to 
reduce the building time (2) should we use more time and involve more learning and capacity 
building (3) should we pay attention to both issues, however the price for both building in 
restricted time and learning the local on the way may be high.   
 
6.4. Future research 
Broadly, I recommend that different positions/ point of view of institutional theories might be 
encourage to be used or the fever specific institutional theories stand point of view to top up the 
gap in study or further research on the establishment of institutional arrangement, contractual 
regimes, and the relationship interactions of business actors and government (political) actors in 
high (political and economic) transaction cost. In the context of this Tasi-Mane infrastructures 
project and in its other international projects, Timor-Leste with the status as developing countries 
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born in emerging world economies nowadays, it is interesting to see how its national firms can 
learn from international contractors and get up from their own efforts to participate in such 
project. It might evidently particular fascinating case that to some extent Timor-Leste has 
adopted international procurement standards in its current regime that not meet its own national 
firms circumstances, on the other side, it may evidently prove particularly appealing to focus on 
practice and management of international project in which various regimes face in one place or 
encounter one another. Refers to its recent development both Timorese government and its 
national industries all together face new introductions from Western style business practices. For 
instance, introducing international standards in government contracting regime and promotion of 
emerging way of doing business practices from multi-national companies in a very poor or in a 
developing country status have a right to have an especial consideration. That type of studies 
might be very useful preferable to comprehend the characteristic of development of actors in the 
context or emerging or advance forms. 
The comprehensive study also has been focusing on how was the national firms involve and not 
involve in the formation of Timor-Leste current contractual regime can apply further research by 
more focusing to development process with the more historical way of approaching within the 
institutional formations history and motives as well main historical actors at the time. This way, 
can contribute to clear understanding of which level national firms have excluded and will 
participate in future. This type of broader studies, for example like this one, attention being paid 
to institutional forces hindering for the formation of the current contractual regime might also be 
needed further follow-up by putting the process of government and its policy, small-actors and 
the organizational fields as center of attentions. This might contribute to the role of government 
and other actors’ interactions in shaping both quality work and competence building. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1 Sample of informants 
Name Position Place and duration of interview 
 
Informant 1 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources (MPMR)  
At his office Fomento-Dili, 1 
hour (took place  in 2nd of  March 
2015) 
 
Informant 2 
 
President and CEO of Timor Gap E.P 
At his office Level 3, Timor-
Plaza-Dili, 35 minutes, took place 
on the 24th of February 2015.  
 
 
 
Informant 3 
Office of former  Prime Minister now 
became Ministry of Planning and 
Strategic Investment (Director for 
National Agency of Development 
(NAD) 
At his office, government palace, 
(45 minutes) took place on the 
16th of February 2015.   
 
 
Informant 4 
 
 
Member of Procurement Commission 
At his office (National 
Procurement Commission (CNA), 
Lecidere-Dili) (an hour) took 
place on the 19th of February 
2015.  
 
Informant 5 
Senior Procurement Specialist, National 
Procurement Commission 
At his office Lecidere-Dili, 11:15 
(55 minutes), took place on the 
27th of February 2015. 
 
 
Informant 6 
Instituto de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento 
Empresarial (IADE) or The Institute for 
Business Development Support 
At his office Mandarin-Dili, (30 
minutes) took place on the 10th of 
March 2015. 
 
 
Informant 7 
Minister of Public Works, 
Transportation and Telecommunication 
At Hotel Timor-Dili, (40 minutes) 
took place on the 14th of March 
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2015.  
 
Informant 8 
La’o Hamutuk Institute for 
Development, Research and Analysis  as 
NGO who monitoring on the petroleum 
sector in Timor-Leste 
At his office La’o Hamutuk, 
Bebora-Dili (39 minutes) took 
place on the 23rd of February 
2015.  
 
 
Informant 9 
Waskita Karya Ltd (from Indonesia) 
Suai Airport Main Contractor based in 
Tasi-Mane project area in Suai. 
Interview at his office Holbelis 
Beskem-Suai, (25 minutes) took 
place on the 5th of  March 2015 
 
Informant 10 
Director of PECAR Unipessoal, the only 
Timorese national company who 
participated in the biddings of Suai 
airport in Tasi-Mane project 
Interview at his home Comoro-
Dili, (1 hour) took place on the 9th 
of March 2015 
 
 
 
Informant 11 
Director and Owner of Tino Lina, Lda. 
A national construction company and 
Joint Venture, based in Dili and Tasi-
Mane Area 
Interview at his main office: 
Bidau-Dili, (30 minutes) took 
place on the 23rd of February 
2015.  
 
 
 
Informant 12 
Director and Owner of Monte Veado, 
Lda. General Contractor, Aphalt Plant & 
Heavy Equipment and President of 
Chamber of Commerce and Industries 
of Timor-Leste 
Interview at his office: Acait -
Dili, (25 minutes) took place on 
the 24th of February 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
Informant 13 
Director of Maun Alin Construction 
Lda, a construction company based in 
Tasi-Mane project, also assumed a 
position as President of Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Covalima 
Municipality. 
interview at his office Camanasa-
Suai, (30 minutes) took place on 
the 5th of March 2015 
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Informant 14 
Uniao Suai Deme Unipessoal, a local 
firm in cluster locations and President of 
Assembly of Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Covalima Municipality 
interview at his house Suai, (25 
minutes) took place on the 5th of 
March 2015 
 
 
 
 
Informant 15 
 
Vice-President of Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Timor-Leste 
 
Interview at his office Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (CCI-
TL) Acait-Dili, (30 minutes) took 
place on the 19th of February 
2015. 
 
 
Informant 16 
 
An International Adviser  to Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Timor-Leste 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (CCI-TL) Acait-Dili, (45 
minutes) took place on the 19th of 
February 2015. 
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Appendix 2 Guide questions  
No. Questions for government officers 
1 To what extent have you put in place mechanism that allows national firms to take 
part in Tasi-Mane project?  
 
a. How do you formulate or organize the contract? And how do you control them? 
 
b. Have you bided the Tasi-Mane project to local/national companies?/how 
Timorese company are invited?  
2 Do you train local firms to have skills? 
3 How important is it that national firms take part in Tasi-Mane project? 
 
a. Why do you bid? And why do the local companies participate the biding?  
 
b. Or why do you offer to international firm? Is it because you need things today, it 
is because time consuming of teaching local firms?  
 
c. Do you have strategy to balance “get things today” or “train local people/firms” 
first? 
 
d. Can you give example whats going on? 
 
e. Do national firm sell their contract/project to foreign/Indonesia Company? 
Specifically in Tasi-Mane project 
4 Do local companies have a chance to partner with international company in Tasi-
Mane project? How? 
5 Do government and local firms have any problems with international company 
6 Who will be responsible for the maintenances of the Tasi-Mane Project after it is 
finished, where do we get skilled companies? 
7 How many local companies have bid? How many have got it? How many have bid 
not got it? 
8 How many have not participated the bidding? Why does it so? How many 
international companies bid and how many have got it? 
9 How do we increase national involvement? Involvement of local Companies in such 
Tasi-Mane project/how do we prepare them? 
No. Questions for firms (international, national and locals) 
1 What government is asking you to deliver by contract? Does it include educating 
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you? Do government involving you in the process? How? 
2 Did you success to do that? Did you meet any challenges? Did you get help from 
government? 
3 Do you have a previous practice on doing this type of contracts? 
4 What where your challenges in getting a contract? What are your challenges in 
delivering the work/ finishing the work? 
5 Why do you bid? How do you feel if you could not get the project and how do you 
feel if you get the project? 
6 Do you agree that international companies who have worked in Tasi-Mane project 
deliver quality work compare to yours? 
7 Why do you bid? Have you ever been partnering with foreign firms? Do you have 
knowledge spillover or knowledge transfer, technology transfer from International 
Company? 
8 What are you lack that lead make you fail to get Tasi-Mane Project? (e.g. 
competences, technologies, equipment? 
9 How do you prepare yourself in order to be better able to compete for bids? 
No. Questions for Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
1 What have you put in place to help local/national firms to take part in Tasi-Mane 
project?  
2 What could local firms do themselves to improve their chances of winning a bid? and 
3 What could the government do to increase local firms’ chance of winning a bid? 
 
